The Role of Individuals in International Relations Theory
With a Tentative Analysis of Yukio Hatoyama in 2009

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Foreword

This paper first analyzes how individuals are dealt with in the decision-making process in crisis situations, drawing on the rich literature written by Graham Allison, James Richardson and others. Second, it focuses on their role in recent IRT, introducing Kenneth Waltz’s three images theory as the starting point, while acknowledging that Waltz later asserted that international system analysis is the major IR analytical framework and on this basis established his Neorealism, contradicting major FPA scholars and making it necessary to draw also on contemporary IR scholars who stress the necessity to focus more on the role of individuals, such as Rosenau, Nicholson, Byman and Pollack. Third, the paper introduces Constructivism as asserted by Alexander Wendt, observing that it gives individuals a greater place in IRT while refraining from a parsimonious application of it. Next, this paper argues that Eclecticism, combining the wisdom obtained by Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, integrates best FPA and IRT by way of bringing power, values / efficiency and identity into the analytical framework.

Last, the paper applies the theoretical framework as outlined in the above-mentioned survey to recent Japanese politics, namely, the Japan Democratic Party (JDP)’s victory in August 2009 in the House of Representatives election and Yukio Hatoyama’s ascendancy to power.

Introduction to Traditional International Relations Theory on Individuals

The study of international affairs is fundamentally a study of states and relations among states. But states
are composed of individuals. The international system, which is composed of states, is therefore constructed of individuals, meaning that to some extent the role of individuals in the study of international affairs cannot be excluded. This applies both to Realism and Liberalism, which concede the relevance of individuals. In particular, realists observe that human nature is power-seeking and evil, which in no way denies the role of individuals. Machiavelli, one of the first realist thinkers of international affairs, made one of the most eloquent and precise observations on the nature and importance of individuals, capable of acting on the basis of their free will.

“However the free will of individuals cannot be deprived of. Even if destiny can freely preside over half of individuals’ activities, at least destiny leaves to our own discretion half or nearly half of the outstanding individuals’ activities. This is the reality as I see it (Machiavelli 1532 / 1975, 143).”

Hans Morgenthau illustrated lucidly that it was the ability of statesmen, not his motives, that makes a policy success or not, underlying the importance of individuals in charge:

“What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman, his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful political action (Morgenthau 1978 / 1985, 6).”

In general, Liberals have placed more focus on the role of individuals. Since Liberals believe that human nature is fundamentally good and consider that the world may be transformed by the actions of individuals, emphasis on the individual is a natural conclusion. In his article “Individuals, Individualism and World Politics” in Individualism and World Politics (1999) Michel Girard states that Liberal Enlightenment thinking clarified the role of individuals in international affairs. Girard argues that all kinds of theories from Grotius’s concept of international law to nineteenth-century thinking ranging from Kant, Cobden, Proudhon, and even Marx have “contributed to keep open the question of the place and role of the individual in world politics.” The first half of the 20th century, particularly 1918-1930, saw “a strong comeback of an idealism which favoured the individualistic approach (both Girard 1999, 8).”

The overall picture of individuals grew more complicated in the 1980s under the influence of Neorealists and Neoliberals, whose emphasis on ‘structures’ and ‘institutions’ marginalized the role of individuals in international affairs, albeit to a different degree. In the case of Neorealists, since Waltz’s major conten-
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The role of individuals in the decision-making process became less important. In his Theory of International Politics (1979) he hardly deals with individuals\(^2\). The Neoliberals recognized that through a learning process cooperation could lead to institutions. Keohane wrote in 1984 that “Sophisticated students of institutions and rules view institutions as ‘recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge (Young 1980, 337)’ and they regard these patterns of practice as significant because they affect state behavior (Keohane 1984 / 2005, 8).”

Against the prevalence of Neo-Neo theories, which brought about ‘deterministic’ thinking in the analysis of international relations, there emerged three new directions to focus on the importance of individuals, particularly after the end of the Cold War: 1) more attention to another academic discipline that could be defined as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) ; 2) spread of IRT, which focused more on the role of individuals; and 3) rise of Constructivism, leading to theoretical Eclecticism.

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Foreign Policy in a Crisis Situation

Whereas the study of International Relations, from the time of Thucydides to this day, primarily dealt with the issue concerning the nature and characteristics of the international system and the key issue of why certain actions are taken by states, FPA concentrates on the process of decision-making in a state. It therefore takes for granted the role of individuals, because decisions are taken by individuals in all international affairs.

FPA may be divided into two parts: in a normal situation or in a crisis situation. The analysis of Foreign Policy under normal conditions is usually covered by the analysis of diplomacy. But it is Foreign Policy in a crisis situation that places more focus on the role of individuals in the decision-making process. Crisis may be defined as “an acute conflict between two or more states, associated with a specific issue and involving a perception by decision-makers of a serious risk of war (Richardson 1994, 12).” In comparison to diplomacy, in a crisis situation there is a clear new factor ‘risk of war’. This means not only negotiations, but also the possible or actual use of force becomes an integral part of the analysis. In a crisis situation, the outcome of the leaders’ decisions therefore becomes much clearer, namely in the form of war or peace.

Graham Allison and James Richardson in the Analysis of FP in a Crisis Situation

Graham Allison’s work Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971) may be considered
as laying the foundation for subsequent work on the analysis of Foreign Policy in a crisis situation. The book addresses the Cuban missile crisis, which was perhaps the single most dangerous incident that brought the world close to WWIII. But most importantly, the book introduces three models of decision-making, which serve as a basis to analyze other crises from the Foreign Policy perspective. The three models of analysis are the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational Behaviour Model and the Governmental Politics Model.

Irving Janis carries forward Graham Allison’s analysis in his *Groupthink* (1972), noting that “Allison presents the three approaches as conceptual models to help social scientists generate hypotheses and discern important features that might otherwise be overlooked when they are trying to explain how and why a new foreign policy decision came about (Janis 1982, 7).” The group dynamics approach introduced by Janis should be considered as a fourth conceptual approach in addition to Allison’s three approaches.

In his *Analogies at War* (1992), Yuen Foong Khong analyses US decision-making in 1965 vis-à-vis Vietnam. He focuses on the issue of why and how the US decision to become involved in Vietnam was taken and argues that a comparative analysis of options open to the decision-makers is useful in order to understand why and how certain decisions were taken, while stating that “those who believe that decision-making theories are essential to understanding international politics have a rich vein to mine here (Khong 1992, 55).” He then remarks, “The most systematic expression of the options-based approach is Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision*. Allison’s work has become a classic in foreign policy studies in part because it frames the problem ingeniously. … Allison wants to explain why the blockade option was selected over the other five options. … [I] t is difficult to deny that focusing on the fates of the various options allows Allison to conduct a theoretically rich investigation (Khong 1992, 56).”

James Richardson’s *Crisis Diplomacy, The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (1994) is a landmark monograph on Foreign Policy in crisis situations, theoretically synthesizing past analyses based on empirical research on major crises in international relations since the middle of the 19th century. He applies five theoretical assumptions to the decision-making process of crisis diplomacy, which, in turn, can be related to the three models developed by Allison:

- Theory of rational choice (Richardson) – Rational Actor Model I (Allison)
- Impaired rationality: organisational and political theories (Richardson) – Organisational Behaviour Model II and Governmental Politics Model III (Allison)
- Psychological theories of impaired rationality (only Richardson)
- Theories of adversary interaction (supplementary analysis in Richardson)
- Systemic and deterministic theories (lynchpin of IR theories in Richardson)
**Rational Actor Model**

Allison’s Rational Actor Model is based on the assumption that decision-makers act rationally, the focus of the analysis being the ends the political actors want to achieve and the policy measures used to achieve these ends. The crucial point here is the rationality between the objectives to achieve national interests and the measures to achieve these objectives. Allison pointed out that in the decision-making that led to the crisis and finally ended that crisis in Cuba, both in Moscow and Washington there was this rationality. But when one assumes that behind this model there is an international system of anarchy, and then looks at the rationality of individuals in relation to this anarchy, this model may be connected to the systemic analysis of International Relations. As we will see later, the discourse between Alison and Kenneth Waltz opens on this point.

Richardson’s theory of rational choice acknowledges Allison’s RAM: “We may follow Graham Allison in seeing rational-actor theories as the typical mode of explaining foreign policy decisions, by scholars and laymen alike, and in identifying their ‘trademark’ as ‘the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations and governments’ … but he allows for variants of his basic model, including one – especially relevant for the present study – in which the rational actor is the individual decision-maker (Richardson 1994, 14).”

Richardson further elaborates that a strict rational theory that assumes perfect rational choices does not seem to conform to reality, and that rather the informal rational choices which have a broader basis for policy choices seem to be closer to reality. “To say that truth is necessary for rational beliefs clearly is to require too much; to say that consistency is sufficient, is to demand too little. … The concept may be used both normatively and descriptively. Used normatively, for example, it enjoins individuals and institutions to adopt procedures whereby important decisions are made on a thorough assessment of the relevant information. Used descriptively, it refers to the extent to which particular actors are found to meet this and like criteria for rationality. (Richardson 1994, 357).”

**Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental Politics Model**

Allison argues that his Models II and III, namely the Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental Politics Model, emphasise factors that affect rational decision-making in any country. These factors are all related to internal politics and division of interests within a country. By definition, organisational rigidities and limitations condition the decision-making of respective leaders. Domestic and local bureaucratic politics condition Foreign Policy decision-making.

Allison further argues that the Rational Actor Model, his Model I, is crucial to the analysis, but once
combined with the Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental Politics Model, one can obtain a deeper and more holistic understanding of how and why Cuban the missile crisis happened. All decisions were ultimately taken by Khrushchev and Kennedy. Model I (RAM) focuses on the nature and quality of the ‘reasoning’ which took place inside these two individuals. Models II and III either focus on domestic organisations or on internal or local bureaucracy, thus influencing, conditioning or hampering their reasoning.

Richardson’s factor ‘Impaired rationality: organisational and political theories’ is completely in line with Allison’s Models II and III. The line of logic is almost identical: “organizational and political conditions inherent in collective action” can impair “the rationality of politics and outcomes (Richardson 1994, 18-19).” However, Richardson cautions that the line between the first model of rationality and the second and third models of organisational and political irrationality is not sharply drawn. Graham Allison’s analysis may create an impression of rationality in Model I (RAM) and irrationality in Models II and III. “The presumption that collective decision-making leads to irrationality, however, is challenged by Snyder and Diesing’s finding that collective decision-making structures achieved greater rationality than decisions taken by a single leader, alone or in consultation with a key adviser (Richardson 1994, 18-19).”

Perceptual and Psychological Aspects

Irving Janis defines groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members'strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis 1982, 9).” Errors committed by individuals may be greatly augmented by a group process that produces shared miscalculations (Janis 1982, 6-7). In connection with Allison’s three models, the groupthink model can be understood as one more internal or domestic factor that conditions rational thinking. At the same time, it is a factor which emphasises the perceptions of leaders and the small group surrounding and influencing the leader. Allison’s organisational and bureaucratic Models II and III are more focused on structural impediments within a state. Groupthink is also structural in the sense that it is based on the formation of a group within political organisations. However, the major focus of the analysis is psychological and perceptual.

Yuen Foong Khong’s Analogies at War (1992) is another analysis focusing on the psychology and perception of leaders and their teams. Or, to be more precise, the primary focus of his analysis is the US decision-making in 1965 in connection with its involvement in Vietnam. The chief analytical tool utilised by Khong is Analogical Explanation (AE) : “Simply stated, the AE framework suggests that analogies are cognitive devices that ‘help’ policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-mak-
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Waltz’s Three Images Theory and the Alienation of Decision Analysis

Waltz’s preoccupation with the structure of the international system shifted the focus away from Foreign Policy decision analysis. This is ironic and somewhat tragic, because Waltz started his International Relations analysis with his three images theory, an important breakthrough concept that gave individuals a stable position in the IRT.

Waltz developed his three images theory in Man, the State and War, published in 1954. He called them ‘images’, but they could also be called ‘layers’. The first ‘image’ was individuals, the second ‘image’ was states seen from internal perspectives or factors, and the third ‘image’ was the international system composed by states. Waltz claimed the superiority of the third ‘image’, concluding that the actions of states are based on power considerations in the international system, which is fundamentally anarchic: “[The third image] reveals why, in the absence of tremendous changes in the factors included in the first and second images, war will be perpetually associated with the existence of separate sovereign states (Waltz 1954 / 2001, 237-238).”

The superiority of the third image, grasping the essence of the international system, led Waltz to define the first and second images as factors which limit the exogenous analysis of the international system: “The theories of international politics that concentrate causes of individual or national level are reduction-
Waltz’s view that international system analysis alone is able to deal with the whole and that the individual and national levels of analysis can only partially cover all aspects of decision-making, had a profound impact on the IRT thereafter. It relegated ‘decisions’ to a secondary position in the IR analysis, it turned the focus away from individuals who are key actors in decision-making, and it established the supremacy of the ultimate exogenous structure of the whole, namely the international system.

Richardson’s systemic analysis is very different from Waltz’s somewhat restricted analysis of system structure. Richardson starts his analysis with the systemic theories which developed among IR scholars: “Among systemic theories, we may distinguish between parsimonious theories of the system structure in Waltz’s sense (‘the number of major actors and the gross distribution of military power among them’) and those which may be termed the historical sociology of international systems, developed by historians such as F.H. Hinsley and Paul Schroeder, which differentiate among systems in terms of multiple criteria, giving weight to normative as well as structural considerations. … Many historians … assume that leaders exercise genuine choice, thus aligning themselves with the ‘decision-making’ rather than the ‘state-as-actor’ theorists (Richardson 1994, 21-22).”

Richardson gives a detailed analysis of ‘the historical sociology of international systems’. He distances himself from Waltz’s deterministic system analysis, outlining the changing arena, alignments and norms to identify the nature of the respective system as factors surrounding each crisis. “The most prominent contemporary theory of the international system, Waltz’s neo-realist theory of systemic structure, has limited relevance to the present inquiry (Richardson 1994, 351).”

Thus the rift between Waltz and Richardson is profound. But if one compares the way their analysis is constructed, there is also a parallel to be seen. The first of Richardson’s three major criteria of crisis analysis is rational theory (formal or informal), which evaluates the rationality of decision-making. One factor taken into consideration in the decision-making process is the state of the international system. The significance is very different, but there is a parallel to Waltz’s third image of the international system. Richardson’s second criterion of decision-making is the psychology of the individual, again showing a clear parallel to Waltz’s first image of individuals. Finally, Richardson’s third criterion, the organisational and political factor, is a distinct parallel to Waltz’s second image of the internal political situation.
Richardson does not claim superiority of his analysis of decision-making in a crisis situation over the IRT. In contrast, Waltz maintains that only the analysis of the international system reaches the holistic structure of international affairs, treating decision-making analysis, which boils down to individuals or national state analyses as reductionist. For Richardson, however, in the decision-making process the individuals and national state analyses are equally important as the rationality analysis, meaning that at this point Waltz and Richardson inevitably drift apart.

**Waltz versus Allison**

In order to further understand the outlook of Waltz on the IRT we consider his view on Graham Allison: “Graham Allison betrays a similar confusion. His three models purport to offer alternative approaches to the study of international politics. Only model I, however, is an approach to the study of international politics. Models II and III are approaches to the study of foreign policy. Offering the bureaucratic-politics approaches as an alternative to the state-as-an-actor approach is like saying that a theory of the firm is an alternative to a theory of the market, a mistake no competent economist would make (Waltz 1979, 122).”

This statement needs careful evaluation. First, does Graham Allison claim to present an alternative to the study of international politics? Graham Allison’s analysis of the classical theory of International Relations is justly famous. It is short, but it includes major aspects of Classical Realism, Neorealism (Structural Realism), International Institutionalism, and Liberalism in the discussion (Allison 1999, 26-48). The analysis seems to cover these -isms so well that it almost pretends to be an alternative to these -isms. But in fact it is not. When it comes to the point of linking these classical theories to the RAM (Rational Actor Model), which is the focal point of Allison’s writing, he just states that: “In its simplest form, the RAM links purpose and action. … The full RAM includes not only objectives but also calculations about the situation in which the actor finds himself (Allison 1999, 49).”

Second, why does Waltz argue that Model I is the study of international politics, whereas Models II and III are approaches to the study of foreign policy? I argue that this assertion cannot be accepted by Allison, who evenly deals with the three models. “In attempting to explain what happened, each distinguished certain features as the relevant determinants. Each combed out the numerous details in a limited number of causal strands that were woven into the most important ‘reasons’ for what happened (Allison 1999, 379).” The three factors are mutually reinforcing, so why should one belong to the category of international politics and the others to Foreign Policy?

Waltz sees in Allison’s RAM a reflection of the anarchic structure of the international system. But from Allison’s point of view, that aspect is not a testimony to the international system as argued by Waltz.
It is just RAM explaining the causality of ‘purpose and action’. Leaders want to achieve certain ends, while perceiving the international system in a certain way. This perception becomes an important driver behind their decisions and actions. Allison, therefore, counter-argues that it is Waltz’s preconception of structural systemic Neorealism which distorts his view on Allison:

“Waltz’s claim that a bright line divides “a systematic theory of international politics” from a “theory of foreign policy”, is mistaken. Waltz asserts that it is an “error to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy”, that “international politics is not foreign policy.” But in fact … “the subject of systemic theories in their original domain is and should be states’ foreign policies and their consequences”. Only by perverse definition can the claim that these are sharply distinct domains be defended (Allison 1999, 404).”

Recent Emphasis on the Role of Individuals in the IR Theories
At the time when the major orientations of IR analysis were dominated by Neo-Neo theories, each of which concentrated on structure or institutions and paid less attention to the role of individuals in the IRT, some scholars proposed that more attention should be given to their role. Because Waltz had advocated the predominance of the third image, the anarchic international system, the scholars who supported the importance of individuals in the IRT used him as their springboard to clarify their own position. This applies to James Rosenau, whose analysis was done from the perspective of globalisation, and to Michael Nicholson, who started from the perspective of changing political structure. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack even straightforwardly challenged Waltz’s neglect of individuals.

James Rosenau versus Waltz
In 1990, in the changing political climate at the end of the Cold War, James Rosenau published a book entitled Turbulence in World Politics, a Theory of Change and Continuity. This book looks at international affairs from a new perspective. The main focus of Rosenau’s analysis could be summarised as a change of actors. Rosenau studies the changes that are taking place in the post-Cold War era, influenced by the information technology revolution. In this constellation, one conspicuous factor in Rosenau’s view is the growing importance of the role of individuals in the conduct of international affairs. Michel Girard argues that this is “a book about world politics in which individuals occupy an absolutely central position (Girard 1999, 10).”
Rosenau analyses the fundamental changes from the old paradigm to the new paradigm in his study of structures of world politics. The old paradigm is “the premise of state predominance and constantly tempted to cling to familiar assumptions about hierarchy, authority, and sovereignty. … The work of Kenneth Waltz exemplifies this position.” Then Rosenau quotes amply from Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, arguing that: “As Waltz sees it, this structural predominance of states is sufficient to obviate the need for theorizing afresh (both Rosenau 1990, 244-245).” Rosenau observes that world politics are facing a fundamental change, engulfed by turbulence. This requires a new paradigm. “The result is a paradigm that neither circumvents nor negates the state-centric model, but preserves it in a larger context, one that posits sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors as inhabitants of separate worlds that interact in such a way as to make their coexistence possible (Rosenau, 1990, 246).” This leads us to the core of Rosenau’s analysis: the actors’ analysis, a masterpiece showing how individuals began to play a more crucial role, due to information technology and globalisation.

Rosenau introduces the notion of actors at micro- and macrolevels. Microactors are defined as (1) citizens, members, (2) officials, leaders, (3) private actors. Macroactors are defined as (4) states, (5) subgroups, (6) transnational organisations, (7) leaderless public, and (8) movements (Rosenau 1990, 119). Rosenau states that the abovementioned turbulence accounts for some fundamental changes occurring with these micro- and macroactors. What kinds of changes are taking place? In the analysis of this turbulence-induced micro-macrotransformation, changes are occurring in the role of individuals in international affairs. There are four factors involved: (1) authority and legitimacy of leaders, (2) loyalty of members, (3) analytical skills of individuals, (4) and the capacity to attach emotion to issues and care about a preferred solution (Rosenau 1990, 236-241). Then Rosenau makes an important observation, namely that due to the microelectronic revolution there emerged a simultaneous coherence and breakdown of macrofactors. Then his observation continues, stating that behind this collapse of macrofactors, the microfactors are seriously affected: “One is thus led to hypothesize that another part of the explanation lies in the changing orientations of citizens and officials fostered by the changing skills they have acquired in the postindustrial era – that dynamism at the microlevel is a source of macropatterns (Rosenau 1990, 240-241).”

In such a situation the four elements as quoted above will be subject to changes (1) in legitimacy, from ‘traditional criteria’ to ‘performance criteria’, (2) in political loyalty, once ‘focused on nation-state’ and shifting to ‘variable foci’, (3) in analytical skills, from ‘rudimentary’ to ‘developed’, (4) in cathectic capacities, from ‘dormant and crude’ to ‘active and refined’ (descriptions from Rosenau 1990, 211).
Michael Nicholson versus Waltz and Rosenau

Michael Nicholson’s article “Individuals and Their Influence on the International System” in Individualism and World Politics (1999) also discusses the role of individuals in the changing situation after the end of the Cold War, clarifying the circumstances in which relevant individuals change history. Nicholson distinguishes three basic systems of international relations. In the first system the actors are fixed and the rules are clear. The second system has the potential to include more actors. The third system is based on the second, albeit, in reality, there are not that many actors willing to participate.

According to Nicholson, the first system shows the greatest similarity to Waltz’s analysis: “type one system is the system exemplified by the model of perfect competition in economics (or the Waltzian model in international relations).” After analysing the perfect competition model in economics, Nicholson concludes that: “Waltz’s analysis of the international system is rather similar. The actions of individuals as a group determine the system, and it is only in terms of the system that the behaviour of individual states can be understood properly. It follows that, even if the state is ruled by an absolute monarch or an absolute dictator, the range of choice is very limited and even these privileged individuals have no effective control over the system (both Nicholson 1999, 31-32).” But Nicholson starts with the premise that individuals matter in the actions taken by states: “Those who are not complete structuralists believe that decisions are at times real and have consequences which could have been otherwise (Nicholson 1999, 28).” In Nicholson’s view, in an absolute monarchy, totalitarian dictatorship, or specific cases when an elected leader gets absolute power in democratic regimes, the individuals at the helm of society do matter (Nicholson 1999, 27-28).

Then Nicholson analyses the post-Cold War international situation. He basically sees an emergence of the type two system, while concluding that turbulence and uncertainty have increased. He shares some of the fundamental premises proposed by Rosenau, observing that the contemporary political world is one of turbulence: “This increase in turbulence in the international system has been noted and analyzed by James Rosenau (Nicholson, 1999, 23).” Nicholson furthermore concurs with Rosenau about the increase in the number of actors: “Following Rosenau, I am accepting that the world consists of many more actors than hitherto. Further these actors are heterogeneous in kind. … But the sheer size and range of the interactions in the present international system means that it is harder for a decision taker to predict the consequences of any action. … Thus, though it is easier for individuals to enter and act within the current international system than earlier times, the uncertainty reduces the efficacy of the actions, and indeed the actions of all other people within the system. This is what I shall call the paradox of participations (Nicholson 1999, 35-36).” Nicholson’s greater interest was people in less formal political roles. But the above-
mentioned ‘paradox of participations’ applies equally to all individuals, including those who are at the centre of the policy decision-making process.

But then how can one resolve this ‘paradox of participations’ in the contemporary international situations? One way of looking at it is to consider a type of society “where the system offers opportunities, but where the number of potential actors is small and thus they may not be taken up (Nicholson 1999, 31).” This is Nicholson’s type three system, the type where an opportunity comes up that may be seized by an individual who has the power and the will to achieve relevance and meaning. He introduces a new concept of ‘switch points’ to indicate an unstable situation where one small factor, such as the personality of the decision-maker, may produce substantial changes (Nicholson 1999, 39-40).

_Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack versus Waltz_

Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack’s article “Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in” (International Security, 2001) is another study, fully exploring and emphasising the importance of individuals in international affairs. It provides an empirical survey of the individuals who mattered in history: Adolf Hitler, Otto von Bismarck and William II, Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For each of these individuals, the authors give a description of how the international situation changed because of actions (or non-actions) he took. Without their personal action the outcome of international relations would have been different.

From a theoretical point of view, the most important observation made by Byman and Pollack is to refute Waltz’s contention on the structural determinism of the international system. Byman and Pollack are ready to acknowledge that Waltz discovered and defined the role of individuals as the first image of analysis in his ground-breaking book _Man, the State, and War_. At the same time, however, Byman and Pollack summarise Waltz’s argument that the first image cannot provide an adequate explanation for international relations, because human nature is a constant, whereas international relations vary. Byman and Pollack profoundly object to the view expressed that human nature is constant, maintaining that: “Waltz argues that if human nature is constant, the behavior of nations—the example he employs is war making—should also be constant. That is, nations should always be at war. Because nations are not always at war, Waltz’s claims cannot possibly explain why nations go to war. On this point, Waltz is simply mistaken: Human nature is not a constant; it is a variable.” They then argue that men and women can be evil but also good, and that they have mixed traits with tremendous variance. Because individuals differ, they will make different decisions and different choices. Individuals are naturally influenced by outside factors, but ultimately there is freedom of choice, and the entailing responsibility: “It is entirely possible that vari-
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Byman and Pollack add two important theoretical points to the existing theories on personality traits and the conditions that make individuals matter. Concerning personality traits, the authors attempt to deduce concrete observations as to the kinds of personalities and the kinds of results produced by them in international relations, leading to four conclusions: “(1) states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars; (2) states led by delusional leaders start wars and prolong them unnecessarily; (3) states led by leaders with grandiose visions are more likely to destabilize the system; (4) states led by predictable leaders will have stronger and more enduring alliances (Byman and Pollack 2001, 137-139).” When it came to the subject of conditions that make individuals matter, the authors analysed the specific situations in which the impact of leaders leads to greater consequences: “(1) the more power is concentrated in the hands of an individual leader, the greater the influence of that leader’s personality and preferences (Byman and Pollack 2001, 140).” In this context, when institutions surrounding the leaders are strong, the power of these leaders diminishes, whereas if institutions are weak (as in authoritarian regimes) the power of leaders will grow. “(2) Individuals are more important when systemic, domestic and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous; (3) individuals are more important when circumstances are fluid (Byman and Pollack 2001, 141-142).”

Synthesizing under Constructivism and Eclecticism

Rise of Constructivism

Sometime from the end of the 1980’s, the world faced a fundamental change: the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. Marxism and its materialistic determinism waned, and instead, there emerged a new IRT, which probably matched better the dynamic and confused scenery after the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. This new IRT is Constructivism.

Constructivism first emerged from the reflectivism-positivism debate. Reflectivism first developed in philosophy rather than IRT and the key issue was epistemology (defined as ‘how we can claim to know things’ ) (Smith, 2001, 224-42). Traditional mainstream IRT, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, is based on rationalist thinking, best represented by positivist thinking⁶. Reflectivists cast serious doubt on this positivist thinking.

Constructivism advanced primarily by Alexander Wendt claims to have bridged this gap between reflectivists and rationalists-positivists. (1) Wendt discusses the state, power, institutions, and the interna-
tional system, i.e. all issues which are addressed by major Neo-Neo IR positivist scholars. (2) Wendt takes the side of Neoliberal institutionalism against Neorealist structuralism. An exogenous international system characterized by anarchy is not Wendt’s view. “Anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992, 395)”. He sides with the liberal claims that institutions can transform the structure of international system: “on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests...my strategy for building this bridge would be to argue against the neo-realist claim that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process... (Wendt, 1992, 394).” (3) But for Wendt, the most important factor to unite and run the state emerges only through process, practices and interaction among state actors. ‘Ideas’ which are formed through this process, practices and interaction are therefore socially constructed. “In sum, the ontology of international life that I have advanced is ‘social’ in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one other, and “constructionist” in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are (Wendt, 1999, 372).” (4) Through inter-subjective practices among actors, a state reaches its own identity and takes decisions in order to achieve its interests on that basis. Wendt defines ‘identities’ as “relatively stable, role-specific understanding and expectations about self (Wendt, 1992, 397).”

The basic definition of Constructivism that “it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one other” presupposes the inevitable role of individuals in the whole process of states’ actions. Ideas exist in the minds of individuals. Key factors which guide the ideas of the leaders and other decision makers are “identities and interests”, and “identities and interests” in Constructivists’ thinking are inseparable from the individuals who perceive them. It seems to me that Constructivism, therefore, offers the strongest basis to incorporate the role of individuals into the IRT.

Eclecticism

Constructivism is now one of the three major schools of IRT, and it has become incorporated into Eclecticism. Eclecticism does not accept any single IRT as providing a holistic explanation of the world. Eclecticists argue that the synthetic approach combining Realism (Neorealism), Liberalism (Neoliberalism) and Constructivism allows scholars, researchers, policy makers and the general public to understand what, why and how things are happening in international affairs. Power, values / efficiency and identity are all understood as key factors guiding the actions of states. Refuting one theory as having decisive analytical power, Katzenstein argues that: “History is not a series of deviations from a ‘natural’ state of stable or unstable affairs. Rather it is an open-ended process in which the accumulation of events and experience from one period alters the contours of the next. Nothing about this process is ‘natural’ unless we permit our
analytic perspectives to make it so (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, 99).”

Jae Jung Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson applied Eclecticism most decisively to the situation in East Asia in Rethinking Security in East Asia, Identity, Power and Efficiency that was published in 2004. In this book, Katzenstein and Sil put the theory of Eclecticism at the forefront: “[S]eemingly incompatible strands of liberal, constructivist, and realist thought offer different insights in different languages that can be cautiously translated and productively combined in problem-focused research.” And: “For the purpose of defining and promoting eclectic approaches to Asian security, we rely here on the familiar triad of constructivism, liberalism, and realism as a usefully simplified way to address some foundational, conceptual, methodological, and substantive debates in contemporary international relations research (Katzenstein and Sil 2004, 4 and 8).” Eclecticism relieves one from the doctrinaire parsimony of a single-ism, and enlarges the scope and depth of understanding especially of practitioners interested in finding the essence of events in international affairs, while having the three factors of power, values / efficiency and identity in mind, and asking themselves which phenomena can be best explained by these key factors.

At the point of writing, it seems to me that Eclecticism is best harmonized with Allison-Richardson analyses of understanding “states' foreign policies and their consequences”. Rather than entering into this complex and philosophical debate on how the world is composed, by way of accepting a variety of factors (power, values / efficiency, and identity) as influencing the decision-making process, one can enjoy the rich wealth of IRT and reach a better understanding of foreign policy and the international situation. All three factors affect decision-making, and there is no need to draw a conclusion as to whether any one of them is exogenous or endogenic.

Eclecticism, though, has its flaws: theoretical instability and volatility in the application of relevant theory in a particular situation. With further studies Constructivism might develop into a theoretically stable and practically useful IRT where the role of individuals may also adequately be highlighted. But I leave this theoretical issue for future consideration and terminate my theoretical survey at this point and move to the last section of this paper, how a particular situation looks through the prism of the theoretical survey as described above.

The Rise of the Democratic Party and Yukio Hatoyama

Rational Actor, Organizational, and Governmental Models under the DPJ
The DPJ won a stunning victory in the House of Representatives elections on August 30, 2009 with an
The overwhelming majority of 308. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party since 1955, saw its power interrupted for 10 months in 1993-94, but the defeat it suffered this time is generally perceived as a real system change in Japan. With that perception, Yukio Hatoyama assumed the position of prime minister on September 16. Yet, many expected that the new DPJ government would make little difference in foreign policy, since Japan has been wedded to its alliance with the United States for half a century and it faces more serious challenges from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and China’s rise.

The conventional view on the rational calculation of Japan’s foreign policy in the fall of 2009 would be as follows: From the point of view of the Rational Actor Model, there are few obvious issues to consider. The world is facing an economic downturn which started from the financial crisis in the fall of 2008. The crisis had global consequences, and the G20 became the critical framework to resolve this issue. China was least hit by the crisis, the US overcame the worst phase and its economy is already on the rise. In search of economic resiliency, Japan’s critical strategic agenda was how to face a China rising in all spheres and the United States with which Japan has maintained an alliance. Assuming that Japan’s foreign policy objectives are to create an international environment to let its economy gain strength and dynamism, create sound and secure relations both with the US and China, Hatoyama’s government was expected to evaluate carefully historical relations with both, lessons to be learned from that history, the national power of these countries in all spheres, and the values that could be shared with each, and proceed to build trust based on all available information.

At the time of the writing of this paper, the Hatoyama government’s actions do not seem to have met these traditional rational calculations. Japan-US security relations in the post-9/11 situation were carefully crafted through consultations between the two administrations and resulted in an agreement “The Transformation and Realignment for the Future” reached in October 2005 and a “Road Map” announced in May 2006. One of the key agreements was the transfer of 8,000 US marines to Guam and the relocation of the Futenma US base to Camp Schwab near Henoko on the northern part of Okinawa Island. The US government under Obama made it clear that they were prepared to discuss the DPJ’s new policy, but they had no intention to revise these agreements reached with the LDP. Obama’s position was amply demonstrated in his public statements during his visit to Tokyo in November. The Hatoyama government’s response has first been “indecisive”. The US side expressed displeasure. Ambassador John Roos reportedly expressed anger that the US side needs “an agreement expeditiously.” But Hatoyama conveyed to Roos on December 15 that his government was going to postpone the decision on Futenma relocation until May 2010.

Conventional analysis in explaining this situation is to look for the answer in Japan’s domestic politics,
as Waltz’s second IR “image”, or if one breaks down the domestic level image according to Allison, his Organizational and Governmental Actor Models. In fact there are reasons to invoke these domestic factors in analyzing contemporary Japanese politics.

How should we take into account the Organizational Behaviour Model? We can do this by analyzing the DPJ and where it stands in the context of overall Japanese politics. The DPJ was first established in 1996 as a relatively minor party where Sakigake, former LDP members with a liberal orientation, and some former socialists cooperated. It enlarged considerably its strength and became the main opposition party in 1998, when influential members of the former LDP who had split from the party in 1993 joined it together with deputies supported by the labour union Rengo (Sankei 2009, 16). But it gained real power only in 2003 by uniting with Jiyuto, then led by Ichiro Ozawa, the chief architect in bringing down the LDP in 1993, who is determined to create a two party system in Japan (Sankei 2009, 20-21).

As this complicated history shows, the party is an amalgam of, on the one hand, former conservatives and, on the other, former socialists and Rengo supporters. The two groups differ fundamentally, particularly on security policy, in which former LDP members in general favour proactive security policy whereas socialists and Rengo supporters favour a more pacifist orientation. That matrix is further complicated because, on the question of Article nine, both Yukio Hatoyama, a former LDP member, and Seiji Maehara, who never joined the LDP, argue that Japan should be able to exert the right of collective self defense. Their views are hardly reconcilable with those of former Japan Socialist Party members. Ichiro Ozawa has a unique view that under the present-day constitution Japan should be able to dispatch its Self Defense Forces acting as a normal military, provided that its activities are based on a UN resolution. The JDP has a structural weakness in producing a coordinated position on anything related to security fundamentals.

The DPJ stated in its manifesto its intent to seek “close and equal relations with the US” and to “go in the direction of revising the US realignment and the status of American bases in Japan and seek revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.” But in reality, it could not produce a comprehensive vision and real content of a new security policy toward the US. Internal party politics were too complicated to produce a unified vision. That is at least one reason for its “indecisiveness”.

How should we understand the Governmental Politics Model? There is first the question of the structure of the present-day coalition with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Kokumin Shinto. The JSP is a tiny survivor of one country pacifism, but it has a decisive voice in government policy formation because in the House of Councilors the DPJ has a majority only based on its coalition with the JSP. The failure of policy coordination with the JSP could entail a political stalemate because the DPJ government would become unable to pass any law which would be opposed by the LDP. In fact, Mizuho Fukushima’s statement on
December 3 that “the JSP might be forced to make a serious decision if the present agreement of relocating the Futenma base to Henoko is implemented” could have pressured Hatoyama toward his current “indecisive postponement”\(^9\). The DPJ’s position may have become paralyzed; until it can gain a majority position in the House of Councilors election in summer 2010, it would not be able to implement a credible security policy.

**Yukio Hatoyama’s idealism**

The analysis so far developed gives many important insights on what is happening in Japan today, from a structural point of view. In short, domestic impediments prevent the development of rational thinking. But the introduction of another angle from the point of view of individual actors, namely Yukio Hatoyama in conjunction with Ichiro Ozawa, may offer deeper insight on why things are happening in the way they are in Japanese politics.

Yukio Hatoyama was born in 1947 in a wealthy family of the political elite, graduated from Tokyo University and received his PHD in science at Stanford. But upon coming back to Japan, he decided to go into politics like his younger brother Kunio Hatoyama and became a deputy from Hokkaido in 1986. He became one of the leading members of Sakigake, which split with the LDP in 1993.

In reviewing Hatoyama’s political platform, one is struck by his abstract idealism which may emanate from his grandfather Ichiro Hatoyama, an influential pre-war politician, who was elected as a deputy in the post-war parliament and became the president of the Liberal Party in 1946. But he was purged by the GHQ and the Party presidency was transferred to Shigeru Yoshida. When the purge ended in 1951, Yoshida did not agree to allow Hatoyama back into the leadership of the Liberal Party and Hatoyama formed a new party, the Japan Democratic Party, in 1954 and became prime minister until the end of 1956. Under Hatoyama in 1955, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party united in the LDP to establish what became known as the system of 55. Hatoyama succeeded in establishing relations with the Soviet Union in October 1956, which opened the way to Japan joining the United Nations in December.

During his life in exile after being purged by the GHQ, Ichiro Hatoyama read a book written by Count Richard Nikolas von Coudenhove-Kalergi entitled *The Totalitarian State Against Man*. Kalergi wrote that there was a need to respect the freedom of others just as there was a need to respect one’s own freedom; but for that equality is not enough because it might lead to a rigorous suppression of freedom; and fraternity was essential to balance the fallacies of freedom and equality; and for accomplishing democracy there was a need for a revolution for fraternity. Ichiro was deeply impressed with it and since then adopted fraternity as his political motto (Mori 2009, 175-77). Kalergi was also well known as one of the founders of the
pan-European movement, establishing a philosophical basis for the European Union.

Yukio Hatoyama’s idealism based on Ichiro’s fraternity politics, emanating from Kalergi, is unmistakable. Three documents may be analysed. First Hatoyama wrote “My Political Philosophy” in the September edition of the monthly journal Voice\(^{10}\). He does not spare words to explain how his grandfather was attracted by the notion of fraternity, translated as \(yu-ai\), which Kalergi advanced to protect democracy against the rising tide of Hitler and Stalin and Ichiro believed that it was exactly what was needed in postwar Japan to prevent extremism and create a harmonious society. Hatoyama argued that this concept is precisely the way to resolve present-day Japanese problems also. In the area of foreign policy, Hatoyama wrote that \(yu-ai\) could be translated into the creation of the East Asian Community and he quoted Kalergi’s pan-European aspirations in his concluding remarks.

Hatoyama again expressed his fraternity policy at his UN General Assembly speech on September 24. Quoting Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu’s speech on the occasion of Japan joining the United Nations in December 1956, he stated that Japan may act as “a bridge between the East and the West”\(^{11}\),

“My grandfather Ichiro, then Prime Minister, was an advocate of the concept of \(yu-ai\), or “fraternity”. This \(yu-ai\) is a way of thinking that respects one’s own freedom and individual dignity while respecting the freedom and individual dignity of others. There is a remarkable resonance between the concept of the “bridge” in Mamoru Shigemitsu’s address and Ichiro’s concept of \(yu-ai\), or “fraternity”. Now, fifty-three years later, here at the very same United Nations General Assembly, I declare with firm determination that Japan will play again the role of a “bridge”.

In bridging with Asia, Hatoyama again stressed in that speech, though abstractly, the need for developing an East Asian Community. Hatoyama reiterated Yu-ai and “bridge” as key concepts of his domestic and external policy respectively in his inaugural parliamentary policy speech on October 26\(^{12}\). Yu-ai was emphasized as the underlying concept to support his first objective, implementing a policy of “protecting life and people’s life first”. The entire foreign policy agenda was encapsulated as “Japan as a ‘bridge’”.

Hatoyama’s idealism and the reality of Japanese foreign policy formation
In the four months of his tenure as prime minister, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a lack of concrete direction in Hatoyama’s idealism. The combination of idealistic abstract concepts and lack of concrete content appears to be creating a policy impasse. “Bridging” the differing positions with a spirit of “fraternity” is fine in abstract, but if void of contents, it might first create an illusionary expectation, and if
the expectation is not met, it could aggravate the situation.

What position should the Japanese government take when the Okinawa people’s wishes and US defense policy on their Okinawa base differ irreconcilably? Hatoyama told Obama at their summit meeting on November 13, when faced with Obama’s urge to implement expeditiously the present agreement on Futenma, “trust me” and Obama replied “I trust you.” But one month later, his unfulfilled assurance could well have aggravated the rift between the two leaders.

Likewise Hatoyama began emphasizing the notion of the East Asia Community. The notion is harmless as a general expression to seek “fraternity” in the region and as Japan’s wish to have friendly relations with all regional countries. But in reality one immediately faces a policy choice, for instance, whether Japan is in support of full scale US participation in major, if not all, regional organizations. Hatoyama’s article in Voice supported the establishment of a common currency in the East Asia Community. It is difficult to interpret this community with the presence of the US, which runs the global dollar economy. Foreign Minister Okada, in his public speech on October 7, stated that he did not envisage US participation in the East Asia Community. Hatoyama’s “idealism” on the East Asia Community without careful consideration of its contents could damage relations with the US given the obvious US displeasure on its exclusion from the regional community.

Another way of interpreting Hatoyama’s thinking is that he is convinced that his ideas correspond to the reality of Japanese domestic politics and surrounding international situation. He may genuinely believe that the time has come for Japan to take a more independent and assertive approach on the alliance, and the US is in a position to listen more carefully to what the Japanese side is seeking. The LDP has not done enough to represent the will of the Japanese people, this is why they lost the election, and there is a fundamental need to revisit the 2005-2006 agreement on the realignment. If Japan and the US are truly trustworthy allies, there should be rational thinking on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean to revisit the agreement reached by the LDP. It is a challenge to the conventional wisdom of rational thinking and at this point in time, it may be difficult to judge conclusively that this view, different from conventional LDP and security experts’ views, is entirely wrong. At any rate, from the point of view of an analytical tool, the complexity of the situation might best be described through the individual analysis of Yukio Hatoyama.

In fact, Hatoyama expressed his view that Japan should bear the costs in order to establish an equal relationship with the United States. He wrote in a journal in 1996 when the DPJ was formed that “we should revise the security treaty with the US to ensure a new treaty without permanent deployment of US troops in Japan.” In 2005 he proposed to revise Article 9 of the Constitution and establish a self defense armed force (Jiegun), an idea which may underpin the vision of an alliance without permanent deploy-
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ment\(^\text{(16)}\). In fact some observers combine Hatoyama’s analysis of present day Japanese public opinion with his grandfather’s positioning toward the US. Ichiro criticized the US atomic bombing in September 1945 and expressed US responsibility for Japan’s post-war reconstruction. Yukio said when he was party general secretary that the true reason for Ichiro’s purge might have been this\(^\text{(17)}\).

One more person who should be considered in assessing the role of individuals in current DPJ politics is Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa plays a key role in DPJ party politics both within the Party and in its relations within the coalition and with the opposition LDP. Ozawa’s weight does count in the present-day organizational and governmental power politics of the party, because he was most instrumental in conducting a successful campaign over the summer 2009 and he now occupies the crucial position of secretary general to prepare for the House of Councilors elections in the summer of 2010. Many observers argue that he is a real realist, sensible on all issues related to power; therefore, he is fundamentally America friendly and is well aware of the necessity of not antagonizing the US for Japan’s interest. At the same time, he has several political visions from which he will not retreat. Ozawa’s conviction that he is the heir to Kakuei Tanaka who opened diplomatic relations with China do not waiver, as his recent visit to Beijing with 143 DPJ parliamentarians and 640 participants shows\(^\text{(18)}\). As stated, he also held a consistent view that full scale UN cooperation is constitutionally justified. In contrast to his UN centrism, Ozawa may be considering that the alliance could proceed with a smaller deployment of US troops in Japan, as shown in his February 2009 statement “From military strategy, it suffices to have the Seventh Fleet deployed in the Far Eastern Region.”\(^\text{(19)}\) DPJ’s power status is also deeply affected by major politicians’ scandals. Ozawa has long been reported about his political scandals, and prosecution’s sharp move on January 13 2010 to investigate several offices related to him may indicate that he would soon be subjected to serious trouble\(^\text{(20)}\). Hatoyama and Ozawa are said to be on good terms, but Ozawa is also known for his autocratic approach. To what extent Hatoyama’s behaviour is influenced by or even conditioned by Ozawa is an important area for future analysis.

Ways ahead

By way of introducing individuals’ analysis, this paper opens a new perspective on Japanese politics not based on the structural rigidity of “rational thinking minus domestic impediments”. This paper does not deny the importance of structural factors both in 2009 world politics and Japanese domestic politics. But Hatoyama’s idealism, whether it is based on contentless utopian optimism or a search for independent and assertive diplomacy, in conjunction with Ozawa’s realism, is playing a real role in determining Japan’s foreign policy as well. Hatoyama’s political power and the role of Ozawa in DPJ politics will continue to play an integral part in Japanese foreign policy formation.
Notes

1) Jean Jacques Rousseau considered man in his natural state to be peaceful, gentle and with limited faculties, and juxtaposed him to states, which have no limitations in their increase in power, leaving individuals with no room to play in relationships among states. Girard questions: “How could one not see an enigma in the fact that the same thinker who justified the individual-citizen and modern democracy in the internal order, rejected them so totally in the external order (Girard 1999, 7)?”

2) It is ironic because, as will be analyzed later, Waltz’s three images theory developed in Man, the State and War (1954) could have become the foundation for the clear-cut presence of individuals in recent IRT.

3) According to Rosenau, leaders are for instance Winston Churchill and Vladimir Lenin, or Armand Hammer being a private actor (Rosenau 1990, 120-22).

4) Positivism is defined as: unity of science, distinction between facts and values, the fact that regularities of the social world can be discovered by theories like the natural world, and truth can be determined by appeal to the neutral fact (Smith 2001, 227).

5) Two books published in 2003 may also be quoted. Mutiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order, which describes the three major conflicts in Asia as identity cum sovereignty: Taiwan, Korea and Kashmir (Alagappa 2003, 3-4); and John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific which refers to Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism in order to bridge the gap between the Western IRT and Asian reality (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003, 1-20).

6) Obama’s speech on November 14 stated: “We’ve agreed to move expeditiously through a joint working group to implement the agreement that the two governments reached on restructuring US forces in Okinawa.” http://www.asahi.com/international/update/1114/TKY200911140197.html access 2009/12/13

7) Asahi Shinbun, December 5, 2009

8) Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 2009

9) Sankei Shinbun, December 4, 2009

10) http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/090810_e.doc access 2009/11/02


12) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin.html access 2009/11/02

13) Asahi Shinbun, November 19 evening, 2009

14) Sankei shinbun, October 8, 2009

15) Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2009

16) http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/tentative_plan/shian1.doc access 2009/11/02

17) Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2009

18) Asahi Shinbun, December 11, 2009

19) Sankei Shinbun, February 25, 2009

20) Hatoyama’s scandal had also been reported widely after his election as PM. But his case was apparently related to his mother’s undeclared campaign donation and Hatoyama paid back ¥ 575 million as additional tax at the end of December 2009.
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