

# Russia and Japan: Modernization in the Second Half of the XIX Century as a Precursor of the Revolutions of XX Century

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## ロシアと日本：19世紀後半における近代化 ～20世紀の革命への前兆として

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### Summary

The article is aimed to study the process of modernization, which took place in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Russia and Japan. The authors, analyzing “the epoch of great reforms” in Russia and period of Meiji Restoration in Japan, pay attention to the similarities and differences during the realization in both countries of important reforms, which determined the political, economic and social character of respective country for many decades.

Russian and Japanese reforms were united by common aim --- to realize serious modernization of social-political and economic organization in the interest of liquidation of backwardness from countries of the West, in order to ensure their own security and possibility for active participation in reconstruction of the world order in the age of capitalism.

In difference from Russia Japanese modernization was characterized by deeper and broader character, touched the sphere of political organization that allowed Japan to avoid serious social explosions and to provide possibility for a victory in Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05.

Russian reforms were characterized by more limited character; they did not touch the system of state organization, and to a great extent predetermined the inevitability of revolutionary outburst of 1905, and later revolution of 1917.

On the other hand, Japanese reforms, despite their radicalism, in many spheres were marked by half-baked character, what lead Japan to become a militarist-aggressive state. But after its collapse, in 1945-51 (during occupation period) revolutionary type of transformation followed resulting in the creation of democratic state with market economy according to “western model”, but with Japanese specific characters.

## **Introduction**

The Year 2017 marked two “Festivity Dates” in the history of Russia and Japan: 100 Years of Russian Revolution and 150 Years of deprivation of power from Shogun, top samurai-military leader, and reinstatement of Emperor’s power. Although this incident is called in Japan as the Meiji Restoration, in essence the content of this incident had revolutionary character. (The Japanese prefers not to use the terminology of “revolution”).

Russia and Japan belong to different type of civilization. American scholar Huntington differentiated Orthodox (Russian) civilization and Japanese civilization as a separate and independent one from all others. The Japanese civilization was separated from Buddhist and Chinese. Russian civilization was separated from European. Accordingly both Russia and Japan took its own way in its historic development.

Quite a few states conducted in history close, similar, and sometimes identical processes of reconstruction.<sup>1)</sup> Even if there are few possibilities to disclose analogy between Russian revolution and Meiji restoration, “great reform of Russia” in the XIX Century, practically coincides by time with Japan’s Meiji modernization period. This gives bases for many observations of principal character.

Above all, in analyzing the processes of modernization in Russia and Japan, it is important to clarify not only their similarity and differences but also to understand the causes, as to why in Russia this process led to the revolutionary explosion of 1905 and then to the revolution of 1917; whereas in Japan, it opened the way to the transformation of the country to military-aggressive state, 1945-41 collapse followed by revolutionary transformation during the occupation period.

### **Commonality of Modernization aim in Russia and in Japan**

Russian “great reform” and Japanese reconstruction during the Meiji Restoration are united by common purposes: to conduct serious modernization of social-political and economic structure in the interest of liquidating delays from Western countries, foremost European, with a view to ensure its’ own security and possibility of actively participating in the process of reconstruction of world order in the period of capitalism.

In both countries the most important reforms, which defined their political, economic, and social character for many decades were implemented.

Both for Russia and Japan, implementation of the reforms were enforced measures, taken under the pressure of external circumstances.

Russia suffered from its defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and went into the conclusion of a peace treaty, which were utterly negative for its own interest.

Japan first under the gun barrel of American warships “opened” the country with conditions enforced upon through an “unequal treaty” (1854) and then experienced humiliation when attempts to limit foreign infiltration to the Japanese islands resulted in the destruction of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki by American, British, French and Dutch artillery from their warships (1863–1864).

Military defeat of Russia and humiliating “opening” of Japan were consequences of their economic-social delay from the Western countries, which were rapidly developing toward capitalist direction.

At the same time, the objective step of their domestic development, or rather, the lack thereof, created prerequisite for the implementation of modernization. A great Russian scholar and Japan-hand, N.I. Konrad, characterized Japan’s “readiness” to reform as follows: “Bourgeois revolution in Japan was not accidental, nor was it historical paradox. The country approached to it fully prepared: The country had a developed economy, national market in relations to many types of merchandizes, good ways of communications and a developed bank system; there were numerous well educated and highly active intellectuals; there were moves of various flows of social thinking, formulating ideological soil for revolutionary changes.”<sup>2)</sup>

The situation was more complicated in Russia. Industrial production was insignificant. More than that, Nikolas I and his surrounding feared that appearance of considerable numbers of hired workers might lead to their uprising and demand for greater right and freedom. 11 thousand manufacturers, mostly fragmented, with about 500 thousand workers were engaged mostly in the production of textiles and metals. Agriculture had to suffer serious crisis. Fixation of serf peasants to agricultural regions restrained the development of cities. In 1851, city population counted 3.5 million people, which was 4.7 % of whole population of 74 million people.

Domestic market developed slowly, partly because of lack of roads. The extension of railroads constituted about 1 thousand km., five times shorter than France and 6 times shorter than Germany.

Russia’s portion of world trade composed only 3.7% and did not grow. Russia exported grain, marihuana, flax, copper, steel, fur, and timber. Russia imported cotton, silk fabric, sugar, dye, wine, tea and salt.

Low level of popular education persisted. In the four universities in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kazan and Kharkov, only 3600 students were studying in 1854. Schools were all located in cities and there were 14,000 students. There were practically no literate peasants. Popular education was considered to be dangerous and harmful from the point of view of maintenance of social and political order. In addition, influence of Western ideas and knowledge into Russia through educated intellectuals evoked suspicion. With the exception of great Russian scholar M.B. Lomanosov, Russia could not boast of the existence of scholars of European standard.

According to the characterization of the most powerful Russian philosopher N.A. Berdyaev (1974–1948), “Russia has been formulated toward the XIX century as a gigantic peasant empire, constrained by the right of serfdom with autocratic tsar at the top. His power was not only based on military power, but also based on

people's religious faith. It was governed by strong bureaucracy, which separated Tsar by a wall from the people. The people, as an average mass, were unenlightened and selfish with small cultural layers, which could easily be fractioned and crushed."<sup>3)</sup>

Russian delay in economic, scientific, and cultural development from the West was no secret for Japanese political leaders.

In 1872, a mission of high-level bureaucrats, headed by Tomomi Iwakura, sent to Europe and America for familiarization of state structure, military policy, military organization, running of economic system, having visited Saint Petersburg made negative conclusion on the status of Russian science and education.

Similar views were also maintained by Arinori Mori, who, before he became Minister for Education within the team of reformers at the beginning of Meiji, went to study in England and then visited Saint Petersburg. In his conclusion European model of social structure had unquestionable superiority than Russian model.

### **Agrarian Reform in Russia and in Japan**

In Russia the beginning of the reform was linked with Alexander II taking the post of Tsar (1855–1891), and in Japan when Emperor Mutsuhito began its role as Emperor (1868–1912).

Whereas Russian and Japanese reforms had much similar character, conceptually they differed seriously.

Mainly, the central reform in Russia became the abolition of the right of serfdom. All remaining reforms were the outcome of liberation of peasants, which became one of the most important events in the Russian history.

This event took place in 1861, and the "great reform era" itself lasted only for five years until 1866.

The ruling class in Russia went ahead to liberalization of farmers, recognizing that this is the only way to avoid agrarian revolution. After the defeat of Crimean War numerous incidents of resistance against the authorities and agrarian upheavals took place.

As S.Y. Witte, famous Russian statesman and political figure, Minister of Transportations, Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Council of ministers at the end of XIX century- beginning of XX century, remarked: "Crimean War opened the eyes of those who are able to see things that Russia cannot become strong with a regime which relies on slavery."<sup>4)</sup> However liberation of farmers did not lead to emergence of strong agrarian landownership. Farmers were liberated without land, and community landownership was preserved. A large part of powerful landowners did not want and could not organize production anew, without owning serf-farmers. So they began supplying land to lease to farmers or sell it to merchants or affluent citizens. Maintenance of community relations in countryside played especially negative role. It was advantageous for those in power, because it allowed implementing rigorous control on "collectivity of farmers" who are connected by tight bondage of mutual

relations. Community had extreme negative meaning, constraining the development of commodity-monetary relations in the countryside, binding initiatives and entrepreneurship of farmers and finally cast negative influence on the economic development of the country as a whole.

As the result, there emerged stagnation in the countryside. Harvest was at the low level. There was famine in 1896, 1898, and 1901 igniting farmer's upheaval.

In Japan, there was also land reform. In 1871–73 feudal dependency of farmers was abolished and buying and selling of land was introduced. Land began to be owned by big land-owners (One Third of land), affluent farmers, loan-sharks and merchants. Law concerning land-survey implementation was adopted and certificate of land ownership right began to be issued.

It is not difficult to notice commonality of the change occurring in the land-usage in Russia and Japan. Presence and maintenance of farmers' community in the two countries had special meaning.

In ancient time when rice farming began in the Japanese islands, it required intensive and collective work, and in Japan there emerged rural community. In the community organized for rice farming based on assurance and maintenance of necessary supply of water in the field, such factors as homogeneity, equality and cooperation dominated. These factors decisively helped creating critical mentality of Japanese.

Even if among the ruling elites in Russia there were no decisive plan for restructuring, the main reform was abolishment of right of serfdom, and as the consequence of this direction, series of other reforms were implemented afterwards. In Japan, already on April 6 1868, as the "highest oath" on behalf of Emperor Mutsuhito, Five Points envisaging to energize "economic activities in unified spirit" as well as seeking "useful knowledge all over the world" were formulated.

In Russia Tsar Alexander II turned down demand from liberal public opinion to limit autocracy and create representative government. What to include in the "gift to the people" there was even no consideration on the constitution. Government structure did not change. Although in 1851 there was established Council of Ministers, it lasted only until 1883. In Russia, Tsar's Manifest on restructuring Russia through Constitutional Monarchy appeared only after the revolutionary explosion of 1905.

In Japan one of the first changes became the directive of state structure.<sup>5)</sup> In 1871, Clan system was abolished and replaced by prefectures, and 8 ministries were established. In 1875, directive to gradually introduce constitutional structure was issued. Then in 1881, directive to establish a parliament in 1890 was issued. In 1885, the government structure was reorganized to adopt an European style. And finally, constitution was promulgated in 1889.

## **Industrial and Educational Reform in Russia and in Japan**

As for the development of powerful industrial production of European style, its foundation in Russia and Japan was restrained by the lack of capital and qualified managers and engineers. These problems were resolved by similar way: external loan, establishment of banks, and inviting foreign specialists.

In Russia, state bank was established in 1860 and then, creation of first commercial banks followed. In 1897, state bank received the position of central financial institution of the country.

In Japan, in 1872, national banks law was established. According to this law, all private banks acted under state control. By 1880, there were 148 banks. In 1882 the Central Bank was established.

In the establishment of powerful industrial enterprises with different level of activities in Russia and Japan the state took part. In Japan the role of government was more significant and multifaceted. From the beginning of the 70's government proceeded to construct contemporary industrial enterprises, found under the state property. Three shipbuilding factories, five military factories, ten mines, 52 industrial enterprises were created. In 1880, in accordance with the law of selling state enterprises, they were sold to private owners, with the exception of enterprises which have military profiles. In this way the basis of creating powerful financial-industrial group (*zaibatsu*) was established.

In Russia, state acted less energetically not only in creating enterprises under its control but also in encouraging enterprising activities to private people. Formation of stock system, important instrument for accumulation of necessary means for investing to organized production, was suspended. S.Yu. Witte observed that "illiterate salon" and rural-aristocracies obstructed creation of stock system, because "simply they did not understand" that "contemporary state cannot become great without nationally developed industry."<sup>6)</sup>

At the same time in Russia, in the 1870's adoption of program for rail-road construction gave serious push to the development of industrial production. By 1885 their extension occupied about 50,000 kms. In Japan, construction of rail-road also facilitated economic development of the country in general. By the end of the 1890's 4,700 kms of private railroads and 18,000 kms of state railroads were created. It is worth directing our attention to the incomparability of Russian and Japanese territories.

As far as the structure of industrial production, basic structure in Russia and in Japan was similar. They were textiles, metallurgy, foodstuffs, and machine-building.

Practically at the same time, in Russia and in Japan, military reforms were conducted.

In Russia in 1874 law concerning military obligation was adopted, equally applied to all social groups. Before the reform, period of compulsory military obligation lasted for 25 years, but under the new law it was shortened to six years. Corporal punishment to soldiers was prohibited. Literacy education to ordinary soldiers

was organized. Reforms cast positive influence to strengthening moral spirit of Russian soldiers, and measures adopted for modernization of weaponry seriously strengthened military potential of the country.

In Japan, in 1872 the ministry of Army and Navy was created. In accordance with the universal military obligation law, services in the Army or Navy were determined to last for three years.

Both in Russia and in Japan, creation of judiciary system with the usage of European model had important meaning.

Judicial reform in Russia started in 1864 by the adoption of judicial directives in accordance with analogical European juris-prudence. "Equality of all before the law" was declared, sworn tribunals were introduced, and possibility of making appeal to sentences was given. For considering minor civil or criminal cases, arbitration trial was introduced. Attorney's association began to be created.

In Japan, together with the creation of Ministry of Justice, city and prefectural tribunals were established. In 1880-1889 Code of criminal procedure was adopted and the possibility of making appeal to sentences was incorporated. But sworn tribunals were not introduced.

Before 1868, judicial function in Japan was associated with administrative power. As the result of judiciary reform, judicial power was split from administrative power. Arbitration trial was introduced; local courts and appeal courts were created. Attorneys received substantial power.

Obviously the success of modernization process was not possible without the existence of literate, educated people, prepared to own and adopt advanced knowledge.

In Japan traditionally literacy education was given important meaning. It was no coincidence that by the middle of XIX century there were 45% of literacy rating among men and 15 % among women.

Despite sufficiently high literacy rating for this period, highly educated people in Japan was extremely limited. Taking measures to raise top echelon, who is capable of replacing western specialists, who had been invited to Japan to help obtaining the basis of capitalist economy became necessary. And the Japanese followed this path.

In 1872 law of education was adopted, in accordance of which, wide possibility of receiving education was declared. By the XX century, there were 21 universities, 222 middle class schools, and 27,000 primary schools. Primary education was received by 90% of boys and 80% of girls. From 1900 preliminary education became free. In 1897 percentage of literate soldiers in the military taken by general conscription occupied 70 % in Japan and 22% only in Russia.

In Russia measures to improve educational process were also taken. In 1864-1870 laws to establish seven-years gymnasium for boys and girls was adopted, so that their graduates could enter to university; and also six-years scientific educational facilities to prepare for highest technological educational institutions. Middle

class schools for children of all social groups were also founded, but their education was not free. Universities began taking women. Numbers of church-associated schools increased for less wealthy people.

As the result situation on literacy, youth education, and highest education, improved. In 1881, in the eight universities more than 10,000 students learned. 117, 000 students at gymnasium; 17,560 students at scientific schools; 1, 300,000 students at the middle-to- primary schools studied. However, unconditionally, for a country with almost 100 million people, quantity of literate and educated were clearly insufficient.

Different from Russian students who actively participated in left opposition movements, Japanese students in this respect behave fairly passively.

### **Religion, Tsar and Emperor's role**

State structure of having at the helm the highest ruler had most important influence on the formulation of content and implementation of reforms both in Russia and Japan.

In both countries, the highest ruler --- tsar in Russia and Emperor in Japan --- was perceived as a figure, directly receiving right for ruling the country and people "from above". Tsar in Russia was recognized as "anointed by god", representative of God on earth, having received power directly from God. Japanese emperor was considered as direct descendant of deity *Amatersasu Omikami* (Great Deity, Shining over Heaven).

In Japan despites unique coexistence of two religions of Buddhism and Shintoism, in the period of Meiji reform, Shintoism became state religion, and in this way, helped perceive and agree to restructuring coming from the "highest priest" who was the Emperor. In Japan, to a certain extent, Russian "three bases" --- orthodoxy (*pravoslavie*), autocracy (*samoderzhavie*) and populism (*narodnostj*) --- may coincide with the concept of "*kokutai*" in accordance of which Emperor, people and the territory of the country compose a unified whole, which is the creation of deities.<sup>7)</sup>

If one pays attention to the historical process of both countries, it is not difficult to single out periods, when state governance, social and religious structure of society, endured fundamental changes as the result of accepting and absorbing important forms of foreign ways of development.

Initial religious belief of Russians and Japanese were similar. Ancient Russia was pagan and its people believed in mighty power of natural phenomena. Belief in the existence of various deities was based on the assumption that all around oneself there exists one's own spirit. It means that nature, its appearance, animals and birds, humans and locality, on which he lives, --- all of them have spirit. From there emerged the belief in the existence of concrete deities. Slavic world was populated by huge quantities of surreal existence. Slavs tried to defend itself from actions of evil powers by various types of amulets.



However Russians in the X century adopted Christianity in Byzantine interpretation, that is, in the form of orthodoxy. Notwithstanding that Christianity was celebrated in Russia, many pagan traditions and festivities coexisted with Christians practices. In this way, dual belief, where new religion as well as old pagan belief and practices were taken into account in the society, in essence was preserved till our period.

Christianity in Russia helped developing literacy, books, culture, land cultivation and construction.

According to *Shinto* religion, life on Earth also depended from “natural deities” --- *Amaterasu* and *Susanoo*. In contemporary Japan, people enthusiastically gain in Shinto shrines amulets and talismans and write on special wooden plate request and wishes, hoping that Japanese deities will fulfill them.

In the VI-VII centuries Japanese acquainted with Buddhism and relatively easily adapted to it, but without refusing Shintoism.

Christianity in Russia and Buddhism in Japan, there emerged new knowledge including in the organization of social life. Penetration of Buddhism to Japan coincided with migration of large quantity of “continental Buddhists” --- Chinese and Koreans, who possessed advanced manufacture technology for that period.

Japanese emphasized a lot from its contact with Chinese --- agrarian technology, city construction, hieroglyphs, state structure. Reform of *Taika* (VII century) determined state structure according to Chinese model.

Evaluation of Emperor Meiji’s role in the implementation of reform even to this day continues to be subjected to various views. There seems to be lack of precise evidence to judge how much concrete and effective was his participating-role in preparing and adopting most important reform decisions.

Formally all restructuring was done under Emperor’s name. Precisely this situation in a decisive manner facilitated Japanese people’s “agreement” with reconstruction “descending from heaven”. At the same time, because of lack of necessary preparation and experience of young ruler, hardly could he formulate “promises under oath” and then afterwards act so consistently in the reconstruction of all aspects of state and societal structure of the country. Obviously the leading role was played by his surroundings, where intellectually high level, motivated and decisively oriented reformers gathered.

Nakazane Motoda (1818–1891) cast certain influence in the formation of Emperor Meiji’s views. Motoda acted as Emperor’s instructor from 1871. In his talks with the Emperor he emphasized the importance to learn natural science from the West, but in the area of morality, Japanese have to maintain Confucian views. On this point he was a follower of the teaching of Shozan Sakuma (1811–1864), who asserted the necessity of combining “Eastern model and Western science.” In the Meiji period this thinking was formulated under the slogan of “Japanese spirit, Western knowledge (*wakon yosai*)” upon the policy of creating a country of “Flourishing civilization (*bunmei kaika*)”.

Partial answer to the question of the role of Emperor in the implementation of reform can be found in the text

of the Meiji Constitution. Japanese Emperor even under his vastness of his power (Article 1), sacredness and inviolability (Article 3), could enact law only with parliamentary acknowledgement (Article 5).

Under all ritualistic power of the Emperor, decisions, prior to put Emperor's seal had to go through multilayered process of agreement. Between the government, which played major role in working out decisions and Emperor, there were informal and non-constitutional people --- *Genro* (most senior state advisor). After the top Meiji Restoration leaders such as Takamori Saigo, Toshimichi Okubo, Takayoshi Kido were gone in 1877-78 there emerged next generation political leaders, who played essential role in determining state policy, advising the Emperor, and strengthening the Meiji government. The great achievement they succeeded to make was the establishment of cabinet system (1885), adopting the Meiji Constitution (1889) and opening the first parliament (1890). Emperor Meiji gave direct message (*Chokumei*) to honor their contribution, first message given in 1889 to Hirobumi Ito and Kiyotaka Kuroda. This was the beginning of systemic *Genroes*. There were altogether seven *Genroes* in the Meiji period, and this system continued to Taisho and Showa, producing one more person, Kimihide Saionji who became the last *Genro* and died in 1940.

One of *Genroes'* important tasks was to create a consensus on the succession of prime ministers. But in the Meiji period they also played an important decision making role, for instance in deciding important government policy. Such was the case for Japan in taking decision to go to war with Russia in 1904 and major decisions were taken at the joint conference of major cabinet members and *Genroes*.<sup>8)</sup>

In Russia, with regard to the decision by tsar, so called "special meeting" was held. There were debates and recommendations expressed, but always last words were pronounced by the autocrat. Because of huge influence of subjectivity or personal attachment existing in principle in Russia, the system of passing most important decisions through the screening of various kinds often did not work. Sometimes to the mind of tsar, not only his own component of power but also outside powers mainly European monarchs cast influence.

### **Reform and Question of Russian Identity**

It is noteworthy that both countries in its history went through a long period of isolation from outside world. Japan almost two and half century (XVII - middleXIX) maintained policies of closing from outside world.

As the result of Tatar-Mongolian onslaught Russia in XII-XV centuries was in reality deprived of independent development and was cut out from contacts with European states.

N.A. Berdyaev emphasized: "Tatar yoke had fatal influence on Russian history and threw Russian people backwards." Even after the liberation from tartar-Mongolian yoke, Russia in its history of Moscow period was characterized by totalitarian regime, which had, in his definition "utmost Asian-Tatar type of governance". In this

way, one can say that Moscow tsars and their surroundings practiced “Eastern despotic method of governance” learned from Golden *Orda* and did not try to establish wide relations with Europe, that cast serious negative influence, constraining impact on economic and social development of the country, conserving its backwardness.

One can say that radical reforms of Peter I at the beginning of XVIII century “saved” Russia, because without them, Russian state “could not protect itself and develop itself.”<sup>9)</sup> During the Peter’s period, Russia rapidly and hurriedly imitated western knowledge and technology, embarked on education of new generation, enlightened in the western tradition. At the same time, Peter I was an opponent to introducing liberal elements of Western political structure to the Russian political soil, foremost to the representative organs of power, that might put into doubt the necessity for Russia to maintain unlimited power of Tsar-dictator.

Japan also during the Meiji Restoration period went to the direction of wide borrowing of Western knowledge and technology. However Japan went into the establishment of certain state institutions of political management of western pattern.

Precisely on this point lie principal differences between Peter’s modernization combined with reconstruction under Alexander II and the Meiji Restoration. More meaningful success of the latter was in no small degree associated with the fact that they envisaged fundamental reconstruction of state-political system that enables realizing the task of expeditious modernization of the country.

Likewise in Russia, in Japan in the middle of XIX century, there appeared and then worsened contradiction between the two philosophical-practical approaches whether radical reforms are necessary or reforms implementation in general is not necessary.

In the first half of XIX century, especially after the repression of *Dekabrists’* uprising, began within Russian intellectuals’ circles deliberation about the place of Russia in the system of European civilization. P.Ya. Chaadaev (1794–1856) responded foremost acutely to this question in his “philosophical letters” (written in 1829–1831), which in reality made a start of principal debate on the role of Russian people in the world history, its place among European states, continuing in the course of whole XIX century, remaining inconclusive to this day.

P.Ya. Chaadaev starts arguing that Western Europe represents unity of culture, religion and morality and is the “only righteous form of civilization”, and all other people are developing in confused situation. As he argues, Russia adopted Christianity from Byzantine, found itself in in-between situation, not developing either to European civilization or Asian civilization.

The autocracy gave sharply critical evaluation of P.Ya. Chaadaev’s view on historic development, tradition and order of Russia. He was declared mad, and his philosophical letters was banned. Many representatives of liberal inclined intellectuals did not share Chaadaev’s position. A.C. Pushkin was one of them.

Discussion around evaluation of Russian way of development made the beginning of split of views on two directions --- westerners and slavophiles. The word "slavophilia" was introduced by minister of education A.C. Shishkov (1824–1828).

If A.Ya. Chaadaev is the founder of ideology of westerners, slavophiles' direction was formulated in the 1840's mainly thanks to the activities of A.C. Khomyakov, religious philosopher, writer, publisher, and brother of Ivan and Konstantin Aksakovs, widely known publishers and writers.

Slavophiles considered that the only way of development for people on earth does not exist. Consequently there is no unified civilization for all mankind. Each people independently determine its lifelong direction on the basis of "people's spirit", in accordance of which all sphere of its life is formulated. For the Russians, according to their views, "people's spirit" is determined by orthodox belief, and the system of lifelong structure is agrarian community.

Putting emphasis on autonomy of Russian development, slavophiles think that, if western world creates its own life on the basis of principles of legal righteousness, then the basis of life in Russia consists of moral and religious principles. From there conclusion was drawn that neither western moral principles nor western form of organizing state governance is acceptable for Russia.

Accordingly, in their views, ideal form of governance for Russia, is patriarch monarchy, based on voluntary support of the people, and in the presence of the monarch, consultative organ is national council (*zemskii sobor*) exemplarily under muscovite tsars. Therefore they were critical against reforms of Peter I on creating monarchy on bureaucratic basis upon west-european pattern, that lead Russia away from traditional direction. At the same time, Slavophiles did not negate positive influence of series of achievements of western civilization, which were mostly borrowed under Peter I period.

Westerners put slavophiles' concept of unity of human civilizations at directly opposing position, arguing that Western Europe is the leader of all-mankind-historical process, because principles of humanity, freedom and progress are successfully realized. Therefore the task of Russia, a backward country, which only under Peter I began communicating with all-mankind cultural development, is to overcome as soon as possible its "backwardness (*aziatchina*)" and associate with Western civilization. Westerners supported constitutional monarchy of West-European pattern.

Views of slavophiles were shared and supported by F.M. Dostoevskii, who even before Aleksander III assumed tsar's position, sent a message to the crown prince (*tsesarevich*) in 1873. Representatives of "pseudo-European development" sounded un-welcoming. They are convinced in making "complete crime" against Russians depriving their "dream about their own way of life". The writer called for the Russians to preserve their own way of life and using "Russian spirit" in order to "bring in new light to the world" precisely under the conditions of

“our own way of life in our development.”<sup>10)</sup>

Most balanced and objective analysis of the results of Peter’s reform for the historical development of Russia was made by famous Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevskii. Giving positive evaluation of the results of reform activities of Peter I, he draws the following conclusion. “So, without exaggerating or abasing Peter the Great’s deeds, it is possible to express his meaning as follows. Reforms naturally emerged from essential necessity of the state and the people. But it was instinctively understood by people who have power, sharp mind, and strong character, and talented.....

The reform, which was accomplished by Peter the Great did not have primary aim of reconstructing any political, social, nor moral order. It was not directed to put Russian life on the strange west-European basis. It was limited in the urge of arm Russian state and people equipped with west-European methods, mentally and materially, and thus put the state at the level of dominating forces in Europe and raise people’s labor to the level of their proclaimed strength. But all of them had to be done amidst stubborn and dangerous external war, hurriedly and forcibly, at the same time, while fighting against peoples’ apathy and obstinacy, brought up by ferocious dogmatic bureaucracy and vulgar landowning aristocracies, fighting against superstition and fear, indoctrinated by uneducated clerics. Therefore, the reform, humble and limited in its initial attempt, directed to reconstruction of the military forces and enlargement of financial means of the state, gradually transformed into fierce domestic struggle, disturbing all remainders of Russian life, agitating all classes of the society.”<sup>11)</sup>

V.O. Klyuchevskii remarks that less meaningful achievement was made in the reformation of Russian social order and cultural tradition. Creation of “reliable cultural asset” did not succeed, notwithstanding replacing Russian *caftan* to European costume, mastering European way of manners, introducing study of science, modern for that period.<sup>12)</sup> “Cultural-life style reforms” grasped extremely negligible circle of highest layers of population.

And finally, V.O. klyuchevskii shows the main reason why after the death of Peter I the beginning of his reform was not continued but “many were forgotten or at best only conserved.”<sup>13)</sup>

He shows that Peter I tried to resolve problem of introducing in Russian society European culture, science and enlightenment without abolishing slavery, which was serfdom, and without restricting despotic power. On this point, he was doomed to fail. In the conclusion of V.O. klyuchevskii, this problem could have been resolved “gradually introducing in the governance of the country representative institutions of the ruling power, and then limitation of autocracy on the basis of constitution. It was not so implemented under Peter I, nor in the future, which served as one of fundamental reasons of the crisis, which paralyzed the country in the middle of XIX century.”<sup>14)</sup>

As if summarizing the debate between westerners and slavophiles, N.A. Berdyaev concluded that “at the end

of Peter's reform, both slavophiles' and westerners' views were wrong. Slavophiles did not understand the inevitability of Peter's reform for the very mission of Russia in the world, did not want to acknowledge that only in Peter's time it became possible in Russia to have thoughts and words, slavophiles' thoughts including, and great Russian literature became possible as well. Westerners did not understand the uniqueness of Russia, did not want to acknowledge extraordinary character of Peter's reform, did not see the distinctiveness of Russia."<sup>15)</sup>

Westernism and slavophilia were united by negative attitude to serfdom right, request to its abolishment, request to introduce freedom of thoughts and words. In the eyes of court elites, both westerners and slavophiles were considered as opponents of existing form of autocracy and therefore unreliable. At the same time, by 1830s slavophiles were reborn, according to the definition of N.A. Berdyaev, to a rigid type of conservative-nationalists.

With the objective of resisting to opposition views, official ideological doctrine of orthodoxy, autocracy, and populism was created and actively propagated.

### **Reform and question of Japanese Identity**

It is not right to think that political activists who came to power in the middle of XIX century Japan were originally united by common or converging ideas of reformation.

Among court aristocracies there was no small number of those who, from the beginning, did not accept western liberal concept of constructing state and social institutions. They saw that their task was, utilizing scientific and technological achievement of the West and in doing so, to expedite economic development, modernize army and navy, thus strengthen military potentials and on that basis, achieve revision of unequal treaties and enter to the "club of great powers". But in doing so, they allowed only limited reception of European customs and order,

Liberal circles, on the other hand, in spirit closer to Russian westerners, the core of which was composed by lower rank samurais, representative of emerging bourgeoisie, as well as scholars-intellectuals, shared bourgeois-democratic ideas of West and on these basis endeavored to reform Japanese society.

The new authority in the initial years after the restoration had to spend no small effort to suppress rebellion by loyalists of *Shogunate* (*Boshin-war* 1868–69) and uprising by dissatisfied samurais under the leadership of Takamori Saigo in Kyushuu (*Seinan-war*; 1877).

Nevertheless the process of reform went fairly quickly. Here supporters of modernization acted as a unified team.

In 1873 *Meirokeisha* (Meiji Sixth Society) was created. Ten most active political and societal leaders gathered. Seven out of them spent time in various European countries or America. Almost all of them occupied

important posts in the government. This allowed them not only to propagate the necessity of introducing European knowledge and culture but also to realize them in practice in the interest of creating “rich country and strong army” (*fukoku kyouhei*).

Convinced westerner was Arinori Mori, founding member of *Meiropusha* and leading politician in the first years of Meiji period. As Minister of Education, he made big contribution in establishing new system of education, proposing “to cancel barbarian Japanese language and make French official.” Another leading politician of this period, Kaoru Inoue, one of the seven Genroes, called for refraining from rice consumption and have bread, wearing European clothing instead of Kimono.

At the same time, when reforms of European style began to speed up in Japanese society, there emerged in people’s mind concern that this may lead to complete negation of traditional Japanese values and loss of national identity.

Toward the end of the 1880’s ideology of “emancipation” lost its position of serving the state, because there were no more necessity for the task of state construction, which was in principle resolved. Debate concerning further modernization of the country concentrated in social and scientific sphere. Having wide social basis, conservatives and traditionalists maintained and strengthened their position.

Despite reforms and outward nuance of “Europeanization”, traditional values, that is, subordination to seniors, collective solidarity, disapproval of such ideas as freedom of individuals or equality of men and women largely prevailed in the Japanese society, especially among ordinary people.

At first there appeared supporters of “enlightened nationalism”. They insisted on the purposefulness to take “only the best from the West, but maintain spiritual values”, and then there developed movements that favored consolidation of national values to counterbalance infiltration of western flavor.

In 1890, Emperor’s Prescript “Manifest on Education” of the people was issued. It emphasized that strength of Japanese nation is to follow traditional Japanese model, at the center of which there was the feeling of obligation to Emperor, state, family, parents, group of people linked professionally or in general.

Before this Prescript already in 1881, under rigorous state control, schools, then higher educational organizations were established. Tokyo University, self-proclaimed seedbed of Westernism and liberalism, became state-owned. So its teachers became state bureaucrats and gave allegiance to the righteousness of the government.

Split between Japanese conservatists and liberals grew along creation of corresponding societies. Capable liberal-nationalists were united in *Minyusha* (Friend of People Society) created by Soho Tokutomi in 1887. They asserted for the abolishment of feudal classes, property and gender discrimination. Its members were against “Europeanization of the top of society” but supported “Europeanization of ordinary people”. They introduced the

word of “democracy” to their own livelihood.

Rightist conservatists Shigetaka Shiga and Miyake Setsurei created on 1888 *Seikyousha* (Society of Righteous Governance), which issued their journal *Nihonjin* (Japanese). Their major slogan was *Kokusuishugi* (National Purism) envisaging loyalty to the uniqueness and tradition of Japan. In their journals articles which called for “do not imitate at random everything European or American”, “conserve own national beauty”, “conserve national purity (*Kokusui Hozon*).”

In the 1880’s we can observe rise of nationalism, which was linked with the intention of opponents of reform, supporters of protection of traditional Japanese society, to end radical Europeanization of Japanese national orders, values and traditions. On the other hand, even a part of liberals began to recognize “excessive fascination of the West” and began proposing, without negating completely European experience, to take out from them the best part, and simultaneously ensure to conserve Japanese originality.

In the middle of the 1880’s second wave of nationalism, which even had the character of chauvinism began. Such terminology as “*Nihonshugi* (Japonism)”, “*Kokuminshugi* (nationalism)”, “*kokusuishugi* (national puritism)” were widely distributed so were the reflection of ideas of refusal of Europeanization and emphasis on national originality of Japanese development since ancient times. On the basis of these ideas, emerged terminology of superiority of Japan over neighboring Asian countries, justifying external expansion.

Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835–1901) did not stay aside. He was an influential intellectual who played outstanding role even before the reversion of power to the Emperor. His first observation on Europe and America, “*Seiyo Jijyo* (Western Situation) 1866” became best seller of the period. After the restoration, for instance in “*Gakumonno Susume* (Encouragement of Study) 1872~76” he praised “the change that occurred in Japan to communicate with outside based on international law and to show to the people the thrust of freedom and independence” and “if freedom of a country is hampered by anyone there is no need to be afraid even fighting against the whole world”.<sup>16</sup> He thus strongly urged the inevitability of “breaking from blind attachment to the custom of the past” and gradual acceptance of values of Western civilization. But his disappointment on China, and eventually on Korea was deep and in 1885, he wrote an anonymous article “*Datsuaron* (Getting out from Asia)”. He strongly supported government position at the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. As the result he virtually helped pushing Japan to join the colonial division of the world, including China and Korea.

In this way in Japan, likewise in Russia, there was some analogical debate between “westerners” and Japonophiles.



## Populism, Terror and Reforms in Russia and in Japan

It is noteworthy that almost at the same period, there was “moves of politicians and intellectuals to the people”.

In the process of Movement for Freedom and Right (*Jiyuu Minken Undo*), politicians from the capital, supporting intellectuals went away to the region, and started new political movements. Their activities included making lectures, opening schools and publishing newspapers.

The first wave of outflow of political leaders from Tokyo was done in 1873, when Takamori Saigo’s proposal to “open Korea” was defeated by moderate policy led by Toshimichi Okubo and when Saigo resigned and went back to Kyushu. Together with Saigo another prominent leader Taisuke Itagaki left the government and in 1874 Itagaki and his group of eight politicians proposed “the establishment of democratically elected parliament”. Their group, eventually forming *Aikokusha* (Society of Patriots) and *Jiyuto* (Party of Freedom), made a constitutional proposal of direct electoral system influenced by J. J. Rousseau.

The second wave of outflow was made in 1881, when Shigenobu Okuma, another prominent politician and his followers were dismissed from the government position as the result of political strife between Hirobumi Ito. But Okuma was strongly supported by Yukichi Fukuzawa and his group entitled *Kojyunsha*, and began propagating their constitutional idea based on British parliamentary system.<sup>17)</sup>

Political leadership was taken in Tokyo mainly by Hirobumi Ito and Kaoru Inoue, who increasingly inclined to German type of autocratic constitution. Very serious debate on future Japanese political structure combined with issues of regional importance swept Japan, until Hirobumi Ito assumed the post of first prime minister under the newly established cabinet system in 1885.<sup>18)</sup>

Populists in Russia relied in the theory that historical development of Russia differed from such development of other European countries, and that allowed directly move to socialism bypassing capitalism. Expecting to “inherent wisdom and virtue of the people” they went to the countryside to the people in mass (several thousands) at the beginning of the 1870’s, in order to stir up “revolutionary instinct” among farmers and call for fight to overturn autocracy. But this “travel” ended up with total failure. Peasants did not understand nor did they accept ideas and calls from the populists. Having lost belief in revolutional power of the people, part of the populists rose in the direction of terror, considering that intellectuals have to fight against autocracy. As the result of terrorist activities, supported by students and representatives of creative unions, Tsar Alexander II and many outstanding leaders under Tsar’s regime were killed. There were supporters of these terrorists’ activities in the army and bureaucracy.

At the end of the 1890’s populists took the name of social-revolutionaries. In 1905 they created

social-revolutionary party, setting up the objective of overturning existing structure and creating classless socialist society. Members of the party believed in terrorist actions in conjunction with implementation of active propaganda of their purposes. Combatting organization of the party was created and it implemented in 1902–1907 series of political assassinations. More than 3 thousands state and political leaders were killed.

As stated, Japanese populists succeeded in creating a liberal party, *Jiyuto*, and their members prepared combat groups and terrorist actions against members of the government, as was labeled “aggravating incidents (*Gekika Jiken*)”. However the government pressured underground organization of the party; *Jiyuto* was dissolved in October 1884; a peasant mutiny in November 1884 (*Chihibu Jiken*) was smashed by the government; thus the thrust of opposition movement declined.<sup>19)</sup>

In this way, “travel to the people” in Russia and in Japan ended without success.

Alexander III maintained extremely nationalistic views, strongly insisted in monarchic absolutism. In this connection, he acted decisively against whatever kind of people’s representative in the system of central power. In 1889–1892 measures to reduce power of local autonomous organization called *zemstvo* were taken.

Repressive policy had its results. In these years of governance under Alexander III social stability was maintained in the country, opposition and revolutionary movements were disorganized and did not show active-ness. At the same time, rigorous regulation of social and private initiatives, almost fully developed power of bureaucracy, non-existence of attempt to create civil society, suppression of differing views generated in the depth of Russian society strong protesting mood, which came out on the surface of the society under Nikolas II in the form of destructive social explosion.

In Japan, where protesting societal mood had more moderate character, restrictive-controlling measures did not seem to be that rigorous as in Russia.

But at the same time, series of laws controlling publications were adopted as early as in 1869 “on publication”, in 1871 “on newspaper publication”, and in 1875 “on revised newspaper publication”. Concerning maintenance of order, in 1887 “law on maintenance of order (*Hoan Jyourei*)” was adopted.

The difference between Russia and Japan at the end of XIX century was that in Russia, considerable number of Russian intellectuals not only accepted socialist, then Marxist ideas, coming from Europe, but also unfolded lively activities to “engrain them into life.”

In 1895, under the leadership of V. Lenin and Yu. Martov, Marxist groups were united in Union of fighting for liberation of working class. In 1898, Russian Social -Democratic Party was created. *Bolsheviks* asserted for socialist revolution, abolishment of capitalism, establishment of proletarian dictatorship, whereas *Mensheviks* for the overthrowing of monarchs, creation of bourgeois-democratic state.

The war of 1904–1905 and its unsuccessful outcome for Russia considerably strengthened protesting

opposition movement. Not only left parties but many local autonomous organizations, even court councils asserted for constitutional reforms. Numerous professional unions of teachers of universities, lawyers, agricultural specialists, doctors, journalists, writers and so on, gathered requesting to convene founding council for adopting constitution. Under their pressure, Tsar Nikolas II, who has perceived refusal of autocratic power as humiliation and betrayal to sacred obligation, and who has even not accepted such thinking that his will may not be higher than a law, had to proclaim, facing the social explosion of October 17 1905, a Manifesto, which declared guarantee of civil freedom, including inviolability of human beings, freedom of words, publication, meeting and unions, enlarged electoral right for state parliament (*duma*), and opened the way to formulate constitutional monarch. For the first time, officially recognized political parties including Constitutional-democratic party (Party of cadets) and “Union of October 17” began to appear.

However, Nikolas II and his court aristocracy could not harmonize themselves to this concession toward liberal powers, and in the following years with all their powers decisively suppressed attempts to limit monarch’s power.

In Japan, different from Russia, legal political parties were created already in the 1880’s, immediately after the directive of establishing the parliament in 1890. At this first parliament out of 300 seats, Constitutional Party of Freedom (*Rikken JiyuTo*), reformulated from former *Jiyuto* under the leadership of Taisuke Itagaki, received 130 seats. Constitutional Party of Reform and Progress (*Rikken Kaishinto*) under the leadership of Shigenobu Okuma received 41 seats.<sup>20)</sup> Attempts to create social-democratic party did not succeed, partly because government prohibited it, but partly because Japanese liberal-lefts were not attracted and were less familiar to socialist or even more so Marxist ideas.

### **Expansive Policy in Japan and in Russia**

Modernizing reforms in Russia and in Japan were reflection of external policy.

Having achieved quite impressive results in economic reform which allowed creating strongest military force in East Asia, Japan was caught by complex psychology of superiority over other Asian countries. Besides, there emerged urge of not being dropped out from European states and U.S.A. in the imperial politics of “division of the world”. Japan directed its attention to the Asian continent, where successful war against China in 1894–95 was implemented, and then, began step by step expanding its influence over Korea. In the past, Japan and Korea had complex power relations three times. First, in the 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> century which ended by Yamato’s defeat by Silla-Tang union, second, invasion of failed Yuan-Goryeo union to Japan in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, and third, Hideyoshi Toyotomi’s failed invasion to Korea in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. After the Restoration when the Meiji Government saw the

world from Realist thinking of power-balance, Korea was not seen as sources of threat, but *Qing* which has occupied the central position (*Chuuka*) in East Asia for long and Russia reaching out rapidly to Far East from West were different.

Russian empire was built on one hand, by ensuring its own safety, and in this context, constantly expanding its territory, but on the other hand, tried to compensate its backwardness in economic and social development gaining new territory, first of all, in Central Asia.

Russian state in the XVI century fought wars 43 years, in the XVII century 48 years, in the XVIII century 56 years, and in XIX century more than 30 years.

In its war against Western direction, Russian war was compelled to be waged to deal with, fore most, the necessity of rejecting external threat.

Different picture emerges in the “Southern direction”. Infiltration to Central Asia began at the beginning of 1820’s and was implemented until 1884. Towards the middle of the century, there was no demarcation of border between Siberia and deserts in Central Asia.

The causes of expansion was formulated by A.M. Gorchakov, Minister of foreign affairs, and published on 21 November 1864: “Doctrine of Historical Necessity”.

According to A.M. Gorchakov’s view, security thinking and trade interests compelled any government located at the neighborhood of belligerent tribes trying to put these tribes under control. He wrote that “United States in America, France in Africa, Netherlands in its own colonies, England in India, all were compelled to go to the road of expansion, dictated by necessity rather than ambitions, road where the most important was to know where to stop.”<sup>21)</sup>

Economic reasons were one of premises of Russian expansion but they were not decisive ones.

Russian trade in Central Asia was insignificant and did not justify military expenditure and governance of conquered lands. Ministry of finance was opponent of policy of expansion.

Frequently commanders of Russian troops located at far away central-Asian territories from the capital. By lack of communication and quick measures of linkage made effective control of their activities from the center practically impossible. So these commanders “expanded the frontier” of the Empire in accordance with his own judgement.

At the same time, Russians did not see Central Asia as their colonies. There was the civilizational role of Russia in its relationship with central-Asian territories, where majority of the inhabitants lived at the level of inter-tribal relations. Occupied territories were also not transformed to colonies as were practiced by European states, and were joined to the Empire as its organic part.

Tsar who was under the influence of rivaling groupings in principle refrained from taking actions which

constrain his own representative in Central Asia, although sometimes annexation of territories occurred even against his order.

It is noteworthy that in the 1930's Japanese military also would be taking military actions in China, without following official position in Tokyo.

Far-eastern expansion of Russia was not that active as Central Asia because it required requirement of large financial and military expenses.

Nevertheless, in 1860 Vladivostok was created and Pekin Treaty was concluded. Confirming the new Russo-Chinese border, it acknowledged Russian sovereignty over transferred territory by China.

Facing the encountering movement of Russia first of all to the Far East in the territory controlled by China, and then actively enlarging its occupation of Central Asia at the end of the XIX century, Japan moved to analogous direction, inescapably leading to the collision of interests with Russia, with which the war of 1904-1905 was provoked.

Under Alexander II Russia strengthened its position along the coast of Pacific Ocean, obtained territories in Central Asia and Far East, did a lot for liberation of Balkan Slavs, exempting unpleasant restrictions received by the Paris Treaty of 1856 after the Crimean War.

At the same time, the country was territory-wise extremely large and poorly inhabited, and notwithstanding serious delay of industry and culture, it wasted already scarce human resources and financial means to conquer droughty Asian desert. Enlarging state frontier flattered national pride, but what was paid for that was a too high price: slowing down of the development of Russian politics, society and economics.

In the specificity of Russia one may add the fact that the Empire had huge but poorly inhabited territory, where various kinds of nationalities were living, overwhelming majority of them being illiterate. That situation worsened by the presence of huge, not effective, and poorly controlled bureaucratic apparatus.

### **Slightly long Conclusion**

Juxtaposing historic path of Russia and Japan in the period starting from the middle of XIX century until the beginning of XX century, one may reach the following conclusion.

Both countries stood up towards its path of modernization of political, economic, and social structure, starting from the inevitability of ensuring external security and even independence, this firstly applying to Japan, and under the influence of natural step of domestic development.

Although starting positions of each country were different, above all because Russia already during Peter I time had experience of massive borrowing from Europe, both in Russia and in Japan, many reforms had similar

or converging character.

Reforms are united in the two countries by substantial influence of European experience of state and social governance.

At the same time, highly significant difference was complete absence in practice in the Russian reforms even in negligible changes in the structure and competence of central power with the Tsar at the top. And what is especially significant for further historical development of Russia, was the absence of steps about the adoption of constitution, that ultimately cast negative influence to the path and result of the reform.

In both countries Europeanization put the society and elites in front of severe choice. Elites of both people felt inevitability of reforms, in modernization which then had sole connotation, imitation of the West. But strong pull toward “honorable past”, spiritual values of past people, acute resistance to refuse them remained. Contradiction emerged and it was not easy to resolve them.

Russia went through two steps modernization, in XVII-XIX centuries, Peter’s reform created conditions for successful rejection of external threat and aggression almost until the middle of XIX century. However reform of Russian political and social structure bore highly superficial character. To a great extent this was associated with the fact that Russian society was not ready and resisted to the changes along European pattern. Reforming inclination of tsar was not supported by prior enlightening activities of intellectuals, who in reality did not exist, and circle around Peter I was extremely limited.

Around tsar-reformer Alexander II analogical to his predecessor Peter I there was few supporters, who shared his views and supported his reform inclination. Among them, there were his brother Great Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich, Minister of Interior M.G. Loris-Melikov, colleague of Minister of Interior Ya.I. Postovtsev, Minister of War D.A. Milyutin, Minister of Finance M.X. Reiter.

Reforms gave serious push to economic and cultural development of the country, drew Russia toward European model of social development. There emerged a perspective to transform Russia from autocracy to constitutional monarchy. However assassination of Alexander II did not allow the adoption of already worked out moderate constitutional proposal of Minister of Interior M.G. Loris-Melikov.

At the same time, substantial part of Russian society assumed that liberal reform digs the state structure and lead to fundamental change of society. Terrorist activities of populists and members of such organizations as “Land and Will”, “People’s Will” helped spreading such views and consequently strengthening of conservative orders.

After the assumption of Alexander III to the throne, his mentor Konstantin Pobedonostsev appealed to him not to continue the path of his father to liberal direction, not to yield to “the so-called public opinion”, because “this may lead to the death of Russia and personally of tsar.” He formulated a document, known as Manifest of

1881 about the firmness of autocracy as well as created concept of counter-reform, appealing to return to traditional basis of national way of life.

In Russia as the result of strong resistance by Russian landlords and courtyards together with tsar's passive and indecisive behavior towards changes of political system constitution was not adopted, autocratic power was not limited, economic and social outcome of 20–30 years of reforms was insignificant, and finally conditions for revolutionary explosion of 1905 was created.

Japan, differing from Russia, experienced towards the end of XIX century only one period for modernization. Likewise in Russia, for Japan too, it was an importance of life and death the necessity to protect itself from foreign subordination.

At the same time, Japanese society to a greater degree than Russian, was ready to accept European style reform. Economic development of the country at the middle of XIX century despites its isolation, was in a higher level than Russia at the end of XVIII century.

There were ideological support of the reform by active enlightening activities of Japanese intellectuals and scholars. Although positions of their most striking leaders often differed on radicalization of the reform and measures of their implementation, the necessity of “catching up and surpassing Europe and America” using their economic, scientific, and cultural achievement was not questioned.

One may say that despites variegated relations of Japanese leaders in the first period of Meiji concerning the width of their embrace and the degree of radicalization, on the whole, in the political elite consensus was forged in favor of implementing serious transformation. This consensus played an important role in the preparation and adoption of the constitution.

In the three decades of the Meiji period in Japan, constitutional structure was created, industrialization was implemented, capitalist relations were introduced and social structure of the country was reorganized.

Both in Russia and in Japan preservation of national identity became an acute problem under the implementation of reform policy. One can find no small commonality in how various layers and classes of Russian and Japanese society reacted to the reform. The main problem, around which in Russian and in Japanese public opinion was conducted violent discussions, and worsened contradictions, which often ended up with assassination of the opponents (in 1889 Minister of Education Arinori Mori was killed, and earlier Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenobu Okuma), consisted in search of optimal relations between the quality and quantity of what one borrowed from western values and what one owned with traditions and traditional bases.

As the result of principal and sometimes exacerbated ideological fight, content of some reforms was emasculated, some of them in general did not reach the standard of realization.

In Japan and in Russia, in particular during Peter's period, in order to master western culture and technology

foreign experts, engineers, and military people were invited. There were about 4 thousand foreign specialists invited to Japan. However in relations to the fear to become dependent to their presence, Japanese government endeavored to be exempted from them, as soon as the Japanese learned how to manage administrative, technical, and scientific problems. These foreign experts stayed in Japan basically on short-or-limited-term contractual basis.

In Russia many foreign specialists stayed in permanent domicile and kept on working in important posts in the government and scientific organs and business circles.

It is noteworthy that in the wide range of Russian and Japanese people's circles, reaction to the new introduction was sometimes analogical. Also as in Peter's time in Russia, Japanese men and women parted with difficulty from traditional clothes and moved to clothes and footwear of European style. No few negative emotions and even protests were linked with changes of men's hairstyle. Long hair encircled at the top of the head (*chonmage*) was supposed to change into short hair. Only in 1877 when Emperor cut his hair, three quarters of men's population in Tokyo followed his example. Whereas Peter I enforced men to shave beard, in Japan, to the contrary, growing western style beard and mustache was encouraged.

Process of modernization in Russia and in Japan evoked protests, more decisively in Russia than in Japan.

In Japan protests against reform at the initial stage was represented by uprising of samurais at the end of the 1970's to 1980's.

Counter-reforms in Russia and Japan were introduced into actions in the interests of strengthening existing powers, for the support of stability and aggravation of control over the activities of opposition powers. In Russia these measures bore far more severe character than in Japan. This explains the necessity of reactions to terror deployed by radical wing of populists.

It is proper to explain that from the middle of the XIX century serious influence over the Russian intellectuals began to cast the idea of European utopian socialism, among interested followers were no small renowned writers, philosophers, and scholars.

Ideas of freedom and equality were introduced to Russia from Europe from the middle of XIX century; it did not find however understanding by, and was not fixated in the daily consciousness of emerging intelligentsia.

And in Russian and in Japanese society within the "new environment of way of life" emerging as the result of reform, certain mood of loneliness, alienation, disharmony, and spiritual disjuncture began to spread.

This found reflection in the literature of Russian and Japanese writers. Precisely with this is linked so much popularity in Japan of Russian authors: L. Tolstoy, I.G. Goncharov, I. Turgenev, F. Dostoevsky, A. Chekhov, who in their writings presented wide, realistic pallet of Russian society, showed difficult fate of people, who are compelled to adapt to new conditions of life, in conjunction with the reform of economic and social structure.



Japanese intellectuals were close to thesis that human being is such existence as contradictory and tragic, unfortunate, not only suffering but also fond of suffering. Suffering even compensates evil.

Japanese intellectuals who appeared after the Meiji Restoration have suffered so much because of the social break down. Their hope that rapid development of capitalism brings in comfortable social change were not justified. There were three novels by Soseki Natsume (1867–1916): “*Sanshiro* (1908)”, “*Sorekara* (Then) (1909)”, and “*Mon* (Gate) (1910)” which reflect their despair, inability of explaining changes neither for himself nor for the country, lack of understanding for what they live and work, and from there, inability of positive actions. It is no coincidence that Soseki Natsume’s work is so close in spirit and philosophical-liberal position of A. Chekhov.

Criticism by great Russian writer Lev Tolstói against the way of life of bourgeois society attracted big attention of the representatives of liberal circles in Japanese society, that his criticism coincides with the criticism which they have against the process occurring in Japan. Philosopher L. Tolstói’s views given in his critics and literature gave substantial influence to Japanese intelligentsia and writers. Especially in 1910 a journal entitled “*Shirakaba* (White Birch)” was issued, with Naoya Shiga and Takeo Arishima taking the lead where liberal intellectuals and writers of positive idealist inclination gathered. Under the leadership of Saneatsu Mushakoji new social movement “New village” started in 1918. Their thinking connoted well to the era of so-called “Taisho (1912–1926) Democracy”.

In Russia half-baked cessions raised voices of dissatisfaction by wide social circles, and limitation of political activities and repression enhanced radicalism of protesting mood, and appearance for the first time in their country of organized revolutionary movement, which after the repression of 1905 uprising put to oblivion but only temporary.

In Japan, fundamental reform of all social system, introduction of constitutional system, which envisaged the setting up of parliament, political parties, election right, were made. But governance of monarch regime, although in limited form was preserved and ownership of landlords was preserved. Mechanism of social control, which would have prevented extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of court aristocracy and military was absent. Under this half-baked situation, conditions was created for implementation by the military circles, independent and expansive politics, which were prepared and directed by nationalistic circles and *zaibatsu* (multi-functional economic giant), requesting to put under their control, resources materials and new selling markets.

As the final resort, the created mechanism of governance was not in a position to prevent the evolution of politics in the direction of militaristic, and aggressive course, leading the country into disastrous defeat in the Second World War and occupation.

In the post-war period in Japan, in practice took place second radical stage of modernization, bearing

revolutionary character. As the result, state, economic, and social restructuring was defined by vector of development of the country in the quality of “traditional democratic state”, but with elements of Japanese characteristics.<sup>22)</sup>

## Notes

- 1) 東郷和彦・ANパノフ編著『ロシアと日本：自己意識の歴史を比較する』（東京大学出版会、2016年）  
Kazuhiko Togo and A.N. Panov edited “Russia and Japan: Comparative Analysis of History of Identity” University of Tokyo, 2016 (The same book in Russian was published by “Mezhnarodnuie Otnosheniya” in Moscow, 2016 ).
- 2) Konrad N.I. “Izbrannyye Trudy, Istoriya (Selected Works, History)” Moscow, 1974, page 195
- 3) Berdyaev N.V. “Russkaya Ideya (Russian Idea)”, Saint Petersburg, 2013, page 58
- 4) Witte S.Y. “Izbrannyye Bospominanie (Selected Memoirs) 1849–1911” Moscow, 1991, page 28
- 5) 政体書 *Seitaisho* 1868/6/11.
- 6) Witte, as above, page 514
- 7) According to the official ideological doctrine, created by C.C.Uvarov, minister of national education (1833–1840), “*pravoslavie*” operated as Russian national origin; “*samoderzhavie*” was major conditions of political existence in Russia; and “*narodnost*” was popular spirit which attached people to something of genuinely Russian origin.
- 8) 伊藤之雄 (Yukio Ito) “元老 (Genroes)” Chuko-shinsho, 2016, page 85–102
- 9) Berdyaev, as above, page 31–33
- 10) Veshnyakov Ya.V. “Rossiskaya Imperiya v XIX –v Nachale XX Veka (Russian Empire in XIX to the beginning of XIX)” Moscow 2012, page 94
- 11) Klyuchevskii V.O., “Kurs Russkoi Istarii, chastj IV (Russian History Course, part IV)” Moscow, 1989, page 202
- 12) As above page 206
- 13) As above page 232
- 14) As above page 263
- 15) Berdyaev as above p.20
- 16) 福沢諭吉 (Yukio Fukuzawa), “学問のすすめ (Gakumonno Susume)” Iwanami-Bunko, 1942, pp.15–16
- 17) Jyunji Banno describes September 1881 as “the critical point of Meiji democracy”. (坂野潤治 (Jyunji Banno), “明治デモクラシー (Meiji Democracy)”, Iwanami-Shinsho, 2005, p.42, p.80)
- 18) Yusaku Matsuzawa defines Jiyu Minken Undo as taking place from 1874 till 1884. (松沢裕作 (Yusaku Matsuzawa) “自由民権運動 Jiyuu Minken Undo”, Iwanami-Shinsho, 2016, pp.i–iv)
- 19) Matsuzawa, as above, pp. 171–201
- 20) Banno as above, p. 149
- 21) N.T. Florinskii, “Rossiya, Istoriya i Interpretatsiya (Russia, History and Interpretation)” T.II. Saint Petersburg, 1913, page 277.
- 22) Panov A.N. “Revoljutsiya Ceva. Modernizatsiya Yaponii v poslevoennui period (Revolution of Showa. Modernization of Japan in post-war period) 1945–1952”, Moscow. 2010