

Japanese Diplomacy towards Myanmar and it's Omni-directional Constraints

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Abstract

Even though Japanese ODA to Myanmar has remained suspended, in principle, throughout the 1990s and early 21st century, Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar has disbursed ODA according to “trends” in the recipient country, meaning that positive trends are rewarded with ODA finance and negative trends are punished by withholding ODA finance. However, this diplomacy is seriously constrained by a number of international and domestic factors. These factors are so numerous and encompassing as to be called omni-directional.

Keywords : Japan, ODA, diplomacy, Myanmar, constraints

Introduction

In May 2009, yet again, Myanmar was thrust onto the very centre of the world stage. Media attention this time focused on the somewhat strange case of American John Yettaw, who had been apprehended leaving Aung San Suu Kyi's residence in Yangon. Apparently, he had spent two nights at her house and this was in violation of the conditions of her house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi was thus charged and transferred to Insein Jail. The imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi prompted the UNSG Ban Ki-moon to undertake his second trip to Myanmar in about a year. In July, Ban met with Myanmar's top general Than Swe but was not allowed to visit Aung San Suu Kyi, and obviously did not secure her release. His visit of May 2008 was more successful because he persuaded the military government to accept and assist in the inflow of international aid for the victims of cyclone Nargis. 77,000 people were confirmed dead as a result of cyclone Nargis, and a further 55,000 are listed as missing. Two million are categorized as being affected by the cyclone. The Ban Ki-moon visit resulted in the creation of the

ASEAN-UN-Myanmar Tripartite Core Group to coordinate cooperation between Myanmar and the international community in the post-Cyclone Nargis humanitarian relief and recovery work. However, the natural disaster did not cause the Burmese leadership to postpone the scheduled referendum on the new constitution that was to take place just one week after the cyclone hit the Ayeyarwaddy delta. According to the government, the new constitution was accepted by over 90% of voters, and the result of this will be multi-party elections in 2010.

In August 2009, the court found Aung San Suu Kyi guilty of violating the condition of her house arrest and extended it for another 18 months, meaning that she would be unable to participate in the 2010 elections. However, in September lawyers announced that the court had decided to listen to her appeal. John Yettaw was released and deported from Myanmar after negotiations between US Senator Webb and the Burmese authorities.

These are just the latest developments in the ongoing saga of Burmese economic and political development. Indeed, through the 1990s and early 21st century, Myanmar has increasingly become the divisive issue in so many international forums, particularly those related to democracy and human rights. Some countries and international organisations favour engagement with the Burmese government, arguing that it is the only way to progress, while other countries advocate sanctions, arguing that the Burmese government lacks legitimacy and commits heinous human rights abuses. Japan, attempting to accommodate all, occupies some middle ground.

When Okita Saburo¹⁾ proposed a new Japanese “omni-directional diplomacy” in *Foreign Affairs* in mid-1974, it was in large part a reaction to what was then perceived to be Japan’s over-dependence on the US. Over 30 years later, Japanese dependence on the US is still a widely held perception, and Japanese bureaucrats often refer to their country as the “51st State”. While Okita was proposing a new Japanese diplomacy that would not over-emphasise one country, and would instead pursue “friendship with all nations”, the usage of omni-directional in this paper is somewhat different. This paper focuses not on outcomes of diplomacy, such as “friendship with all nations”, but on sources of diplomatic action; the factors that constrain foreign policy and shape decision-making. There are a number of domestic and international factors that influence Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar. For the sake of convenience, this paper will categorise these factors as either “push” factors that encourage engagement, or “pull” factors that encourage disengagement, or sanctions.

Official Policy

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government's "approach" (*kangaekata*) to ODA towards Myanmar is based on, "Myanmar's geographically important position between India and China, and on Myanmar being a member of Japan's important partner ASEAN". Furthermore, the Japanese government considers, "the importance of Myanmar becoming a socially stable country founded on market economics and democracy, and from the viewpoint of establishing a country that contributes to the prosperity, stability and integration of ASEAN, and the importance of continuing to promote the steady democratisation"²⁾. The same document says that,

"in view of the subsequent detaining by the government of Aung San Suu Kyi on 30th May 2003, Japan will take measures to basically postpone new economic cooperation. However, considering the urgent humanitarian issues, and continuing to carefully observe the political climate in Myanmar, after having carefully examining the project contents, it was decided to continue to implement the (ODA) project to develop human resources that contribute to economic structural reform and democratisation in CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, the new members of ASEAN) that also benefits the whole of ASEAN. In addition, after the suppression of the demonstrations of September 2007, in October, Japan decided more stringent cooperation policies to Myanmar, which had previously been limited. As a consequence, in July of that year, a Cabinet decision was made to cancel the signing of the Exchange of Notes with the Myanmar government on the plan for construction of the Japan-Myanmar Human Resource Development Centre."

From this document we can see the officially pronounced factors that both "push"/ encourage engagement with the Myanmar government and those factors that "pull"/ encourage some type of sanction. This type of foreign policy is termed ODA diplomacy in that ODA disbursements are used as the incentive to encourage favourable action by recipient governments, and the "threat" of a suspension in ODA is used to discourage negative actions by recipient countries. The wording of the document does also hint at the diplomatic "tightrope" that the Japanese government is treading. Any development in Myanmar requires a reaction from the Japanese side, and these reactions must be consistent, balanced and proportionate to the cause. They

must also be in line with international and domestic norms and values.

The Japanese government recognises Myanmar's strategic location between South and East Asia, meaning between the two economically booming and most populous countries of India and China, and the populous and economically dynamic Southeast Asian region. The importance of Myanmar's strategic location is recognised by *all* within the region. Southeast Asia has traditionally been the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy, and Japan has made a considerable investment in the region. While this was necessitated by Cold War imperatives, in the post-Cold War era, Japan has continued to forge ever-closer political and economic relations with ASEAN and the individual countries of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this geo-strategic security precedence is complemented by the imperative of countering increasing and considerable Chinese influence in Myanmar, which is also a main factor behind both ASEAN and Indian engagement with Myanmar. Cross border trade and Chinese economic penetration of northern Myanmar is so intense that some analysts refer to the "Chinese colonisation" of the border region, stretching down to Mandalay³.

It should be pointed out that the main beneficiary of the international sanctions against Myanmar has been China. Indeed, it was argued by Uchida in 1995 that a continuation of sanctions against Myanmar would "strengthen military ties between the two countries", and this is exactly what has happened⁴. China has provided Myanmar with military hardware and Chinese-Myanmar military cooperation is extensive. The sanctions have essentially pushed Myanmar into dependence on the PRC, and it is this relationship that ASEAN, India and Japan are trying to counter. The so-called "rise of China" has been the predominant concern of Japanese diplomats for some time now, and Myanmar should certainly be considered as an arena for such Sino-Japanese competition⁵.

Furthermore, although it is not mentioned in the 2008 Databook, it has often been argued that Myanmar's location, abundance of natural resources and cheap labour provide an economic imperative to the Japanese government. Considering the traditional paradigm of Japanese foreign policy that the *business-led* pursuit of economic (security) goals is of paramount importance, it would seem plausible to assume that some aspects of such a system still exist. Indeed, there is some evidence that, despite the politically sensitive nature of providing economic assistance to the Myanmar government, some Japanese businesses *still* exert considerable influence over ODA disbursements to Myanmar, and this means that those very same businesses are exerting equally considerable influence over Japanese foreign policy/ diplomacy

towards Myanmar⁶⁾.

The 2008 MOFA Myanmar Databook does mention the humanitarian imperative as a justification for providing some assistance to Myanmar, and indeed the worsening humanitarian situation has compelled even (some of) those countries that more strictly sanction Myanmar to increase (in some cases, considerably) ODA to Myanmar. Health and education are two sectors that are not prioritised by the current Myanmar government and hence those services have steadily degraded. For example, per capita health expenditure (public and private) in 2002 in Myanmar was US\$30 (PPP), and this compares with US\$96 for India, US\$192 for Cambodia, US\$49 for Laos, US\$62 for Pakistan and US\$64 for Nepal⁷⁾. UNAIDS also characterises Myanmar as having a generalised HIV/AIDS epidemic, estimating the national adult prevalence of HIV infection at being between 1% and 2%; meaning that anywhere between 200,000 and 570,000 people are living with HIV in Myanmar. Furthermore, while Myanmar accounts for just 6% of total cases of malaria (India accounts for 76% and Indonesia for 12%), it has the highest number of deaths from malaria, accounting for 53% of total deaths in the region. That there are more deaths in Myanmar than in India and Indonesia combined (two of the world's most populous countries), is a vivid indication of the public health crisis related to malaria in Myanmar⁸⁾. The European Union and the UK, as well as Japan, have all recognised the unfolding humanitarian crisis and responded with significant increases in ODA⁹⁾.

The 2008 Databook does also not mention what was often termed the, "friendly relations" between Japan and Myanmar that were used to justify economic cooperation between the two countries¹⁰⁾. Although relations between Japan and Myanmar never progressed beyond the political and business elites, it is true that Japan provided initial support for the Burmese independence movement and it is also true that Japanese ODA to Burma during the Cold War was considerable. Up until 1990, total Japanese ODA to then-Burma totalled ¥515.6 billion¹¹⁾. Indeed, in the initial years following the military takeover in 1988, it seems that the Japanese government thought that the long history of "friendly relations" and the (accompanying) considerable ODA, placed Japan in a preeminent position with Burma, and, if successfully translated into positive domestic developments, then this could improve Japan's standing in the international community, and provide further justifications for its economic cooperation policies. It is for obvious reasons that, 20 years later, such references are no longer made.

Omni-directional Constraints

However, despite the importance of some form of engagement with the military regime in Myanmar, based on the above rationales (“push” factors), the Japanese government is severely constrained in its policy options towards Myanmar in the 21st Century. These constraints are so numerous and encompassing that they can be characterised as “omni-directional”, i.e., stemming from all directions.

The most severe constraints on Japanese policy options stem from the widely publicised human rights abuses that occur under the present military government in Myanmar, as well as the continued suppression of the democracy movement that arose as a result of the economic collapse of 1987-8. The 2008 MOFA Myanmar Databook clearly states the lack of progress on democratic transition, the detainment of Aung San Suu Kyi, and the government suppression of demonstrations as being key factors that influence decision-making in Tokyo. Such incidences are cited as justifications by most Western governments to impose (and to steadily expand) sanctions against the Yangon regime. They have also led to increased attention from the UN, including regular calls for reconciliation from the Secretary General, the appointment and dispatch of a number of Special Envoys and Special Rapporteurs, as well as close scrutiny from the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Given such pressure from the international community, Japan is obliged to follow similar policies and condemn the Yangon regime. Such pressure has been termed “*gaiatsu*” (foreign pressure), and, according to a traditional paradigm of Japanese foreign policy, *gaiatsu*, and particularly that from the US, is a determining factor. Of course, such *gaiatsu* does not come only from the US. The dual-imperatives of supporting ASEAN integration and economic development, and of countering Chinese influence in Myanmar, are both examples of *gaiatsu* that stem from East Asia. While it is no doubt true that *gaiatsu* from the West influences Japanese foreign policy to a considerable degree, there is also sufficient *naiatsu* (domestic pressure) to also determine/ constrain foreign policy. For example, it seems that the overwhelming support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD that is evident in all Western populations is also present in the Japanese populace, as is shown by the weekly publication in the *Mainichi Shimbun* of Aung San Suu Kyi’s “Letters from Burma” in 1995–6¹²⁾.

In addition to this, Japanese ODA policy to Myanmar is considerably constrained by the fiscal constriction of the Japanese ODA budget, which in 2007 was just 62% that of 1997¹³⁾. While

it may be that Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar does not require such considerable resources, it is doubtless the case that such a dwindling budget would involve a significant increase in intra-governmental competition over ODA budget allocation. Furthermore, Japan's ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar is based on the assumption that, were the Myanmar government to make serious and quantifiable movements towards democratic transition (such as a power sharing agreement with NLD), then Japanese ODA Yen Loans would be forthcoming. On the sidelines of the 1999 ASEAN Summit in Manila, then-PM Obuchi urged Gen. Than Swe to "advance the democratisation process in Myanmar", and more importantly said that "if your country tackles economic reforms seriously, we are ready to support your country's economic reform with our experience"¹⁴. For such a policy to have any real attraction for the Myanmar government, it seems plausible to postulate that such yen loans would have to be considerable. Therefore, a considerable decrease in the total ODA budget does intrinsically weaken the foundations of ODA diplomacy.

Connected to the reduction in the ODA budget is the increasingly sceptical public opinion of ODA, which is a by-product of the popular scepticism about Japanese public life in general, that has continuously worsened during the so-called "lost decade" of the 1990s/ early 21st century. While public support for ODA has been evaporating, there have been increasing calls for ODA that that can be seen to be directly benefiting the Japanese economy, businesses and population. Such public demands as these obviously constrain ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar because it is difficult to provide publicly-acceptable justifications for significant ODA disbursements, while it is relatively easy to provide counter-justifications for ODA sanctions.

In contrast to such "pull" factors, there are also *naiatsu* "push" factors than stem from the internal dynamics of Japanese foreign policy formation. If one assumes that ODA is the main (if not only) tool of Japanese diplomacy (and this is often voiced by bureaucrats within MOFA), then we must also recognise that without ODA, Japanese diplomacy is limited. If ODA is the main conduit for dialogue, then continuing disbursements, at least at a minimum level, are necessary to 'keep the door open'. This is especially important if we accept that Japan-Burma relations were dependent on their ODA component. This dependence does of course explain why, without its ODA component Japan-Myanmar relations in the 21st century are extremely limited.

Conversely, one of the biggest constraints on Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar is the irrevocable ideological chasm that exists between the governments. This chasm is

characterised as having, on the one hand, the official Japanese policy of promoting “democratization and human rights through ongoing dialogue with the present regime”¹⁵), while, on the other hand, the Myanmar Army continue to maintain a strong grip over any democratic transition, as well as preserving a dominating military role in any future (moderately) democratic government. Essentially, the military view themselves as the vanguard of the nation, which they see as dependent on *their* authority and power. Even though one could argue that the apparent chasm is little more than “window dressing” covering the compatibility of traditional Japanese conservatism and the Myanmar military (as shown by years of economic cooperation), the very failure of that economic cooperation, as well as the pluralisation (however limited) of the Japanese political economy mean that the chasm is real and effectively constraining. Importantly, this incompatibility has always been present. The *Burmese Way to Socialism* was formulated around the principle of nationalisation and Burmese control over all aspects of the domestic economy, while the Japanese foreign economic policy of *keizai kyoryoku* was based upon the premise of penetrating foreign economies to secure natural resources and capture domestic markets. The inevitable result of attempts to cooperate within the frameworks of two such irreconcilable ideologies was that the bilateral relationship remained “narrow and shallow”. “Shallow” in the sense that the intended expansion in economic interconnectedness never materialised, which meant in turn that societal relations never developed beyond the somewhat distorted perceptions formed during World War Two, and “narrow” in the sense that relations were limited to politico-business elites. Furthermore, the incompatibility of the policies of the two ‘partners’, and the narrow and shallow nature of the bilateral relationship, meant that the relationship itself became excessively dependent on Japanese ODA. The non-pluralised nature of Japan’s ODA political economy allowed ODA to continue to be disbursed despite the long-term decline in the Burmese economy, and this created what was to become another constraint on Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar in the post-Cold War era; debt.

The Japanese government *had to* give debt relief to Myanmar. This was based not on some aspect of the bilateral relationship, but was instead according to a 1978 UN Resolution and Myanmar’s status as a ‘Least Developed Country’. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan has been providing debt-relief measures in the form of returning (as grant aid) any debt repayments made by Myanmar. However, according to the IMF, in 1993, Myanmar’s total outstanding and disbursed debt to Japan was \$2.44 billion, of which \$900

million was in arrears by the end of fiscal 1994–5¹⁶). In 1997, according to the Asian Development Bank, Myanmar suspended payments to multilateral and bilateral creditors, and by 1999, Myanmar's total debt to Japan had reached \$2.5 billion¹⁷). In spite of the official position that the Japanese government was disbursing debt relief according to the UN resolution, the Japanese government attempted to link the debt issue to that of political reform in Myanmar. The reason for this is that PM Obuchi, in 1999, promised, on a case-by-case basis, to resume yen loans *if* significant progress was made in reform in both the economy and the polity. But, Japan *cannot* forward new loans to Myanmar while older loans are in arrears, and this means that the outstanding debt issue must be resolved. Essentially, the result is a constraining 'Catch-22', whereby Japan cannot pursue the policy it advocates because of the historical legacy of its past failures. While the system of grant aid for debt relief provided some flexibility for the Japanese government to use such aid as a component of its constructive engagement policy, the system of providing debt relief was stopped in 2002 in line with the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative, and was replaced by a system of merely cancelling debt¹⁸). This inevitably further constrained Japanese diplomatic efforts because Myanmar was excluded from this debt cancelling initiative by all G7 countries and by the OECD. For example, despite the fact that Myanmar is the HIPC most heavily indebted to Japan, it does not qualify for the Initiative because it has not met the entry requirements; compliance with economic (and political) reform conditions¹⁹). Furthermore, if a country was in arrears on their debt repayment, that amount of arrears would not be included in the debt cancellation, and this was especially relevant because, according to JICA sources, the Myanmar debt to Japan in 2004 equalled about ¥400 billion (about \$3.6 billion), an estimated half of which was in arrears²⁰).

A further constraint on Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar is the Japanese government's own guidelines regarding ODA. The ODA Charter, first approved by the Cabinet in 1992 and revised in 2003, does stipulate objectives, policies, priorities *and* principles²¹). In the case of Myanmar, adhering to these four principles: 1) environmental conservation; 2) avoiding the use of ODA for military purposes; 3) full attention to military expenditure, and; 4) efforts at democratisation, introduction of a market-economy, and protection of basic human rights, seriously constrains the disbursement of ODA. However, these principles are not binding. The Japanese government takes into account,

“comprehensively each recipient country's request, its socioeconomic conditions, and

Japan's bilateral relations with the recipient country, Japan's ODA will be provided in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (especially those of sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic matters), as well as the four principles"²²).

Finally, the last major constraint on Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar should perhaps be characterised more as the absence of promotion; i.e., the lack of stakeholders with sufficient interest and influence to determine policy. Japanese businesses, in comparison to companies from other countries, have been remarkably unresponsive to the 'open door' economic policies of the Myanmar government. Indeed, as one can see from the following table, Japanese companies have had a rapidly diminishing interest in Myanmar.

Particularly significant is the comparison between FDI figures for Japanese companies and those for companies from the countries that are the most vocal critics of the Myanmar regime, namely the US and countries of the EU (particularly the UK and France, who account for 65% and 33%, respectively, of total EU FDI in Myanmar during this period).

This raises the interesting question of why, when the FDI figures seem to indicate that business opportunities exist, Japanese companies are relatively uninterested in operating in Myanmar. It may be that significant opportunities are available elsewhere, say Vietnam or China. Alternatively, it may be that the excessive dependence on ODA of Japanese companies operating in Myanmar that developed as a result of the *Burmese Way to Socialism* has left a legacy broader than merely the large debt to Japan. Throughout the Cold War, Japanese foreign

Table 1: FDI inflows into Myanmar by Source Country, 1995–2003 (US\$ million)
(Source: Author Compiled from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004)

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1995-2003
ASEAN	96.7	228.6	323.3	153.9	41.2	74	67.4	25.1	28.5	1,039
Japan	0.4	15.6	18.9	33.5	18.8	16.3	7.7	4.6	0.2	116
Hong Kong	5.7	13.2	4.7	10.7	13.8	4.5	4.7	7.7	3.6	69
South Korea	1.4	0.5	6.5	17.1	8.8	4.5	7.2	4.3	2.6	53
China	3.1	2.2	0.4	2.6	0	0	0.5	4.8	0.3	14
EU	176.5	301.7	492.5	294.8	216.6	69	56.4	52.6	10.5	1,671
USA	30.2	14.3	30.6	158.3	0.8	36.4	44.7	90.8	80.4	487
Total	317.6	580.7	878.8	683.6	304.2	208	192	191.4	128.1	3,484

(economic) policy towards Myanmar was run for/by Japanese businesses, and ODA was merely the government subsidy to support/ finance their activities. The failure of this policy, both in terms of economic development and in terms of the repercussions for ODA policy and practice in Japan, has created an aura of hyper-sensitivity surrounding Japanese economic co-operation with Myanmar.

Conclusion

While it is no doubt true that the effort to persuade another party to change their course of action takes considerable time and effort, such an undertaking is particularly difficult if the party concerned views such requests/demands as exactly contrary to their best interests. In such a situation, a multitude of diplomatic tools and methods are essential to obtain even minimal success. If constraints are present, and if they are considerable, success is extremely unlikely. Constraints on Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar are characterised as “omni-directional” in that they emanate from all directions. While the importance of *gaiatsu*, in terms of constraining Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar cannot be ignored, such pressures constitute only a part of the omni-directional constraints. It seems likely that the considerable *naiatsu* that exists is sufficient to seriously constrain policy options. Importantly, these constraints, in particular the debt issue, the ODA Charter, low public support for ODA and the lack of Japanese business interest, all directly stem from the historical failure of Japanese foreign policy to Myanmar. Therefore, the omni-directional constraints span time as well as space and this means that Japanese diplomacy towards Myanmar is significantly “constrained by its past”.

Notes

- 1) At that time, Okita was chairman of the Japan Economic Research Centre. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1979 to 1980.
- 2) MOFA. *Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (ODA) Kuni betsu Databook 2008- Myanmar* (By Country Government Development Aid (ODA) Databook 2008- Myanmar).
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/kuni/08_databook/index.html#I, accessed 15th Sept 2009.
- 3) BERT, Wayne. (2004). Burma, China and the USA, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2. 263–282.
- 4) UCHIDA, Ichiro. “Embracing the Future: Japan must Rethink its Myanmar Policy”, Burma Debate, Aug-Sept 1995. <http://www.burmadebate.org/>, visited on 21 March 2001, p. 1.

- 5) TAKEDA, Isami. "Japan's Myanmar Policy: Four Principles", Gaiko Forum, 2001 Summer, (Tokyo), p. 56.
- 6) See, STREFFORD, Patrick. Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar: A Test for the ODA Charter Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies Vol. 6 (2007), pp. 65-79.
- 7) Human Development Report 2005, p. 238.
- 8) http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Malaria_in_the_SEAR_Distri_MalariaCases2004.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2009.
- 9) See, STREFFORD, Patrick. The Response of International Donors to Myanmar's Escalating Health Crisis, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol. 5 (2006), pp. 37-59.
- 10) See for example, KUDO, Toshihiro. Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged, IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 118
- 11) This compares with ¥74.2 billion for Vietnam, ¥2199 billion for Indonesia, ¥665.4 for South Korea, ¥1056.1 billion for Thailand, ¥1098 billion for China, and ¥1241.5 billion for the Philippines.
- 12) The Mainichi Shimbun won the Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association) Award on 4 September, 1996 for carrying the series "Letter from Burma".
- 13) MOFA. Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007 Japan's International Cooperation,
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/index.htm>, accessed 15 Sept 2009.
- 14) KUMARA, Sarath. "Japan makes overtures to the military junta in Burma", *World Socialist Website*, 24 January 2000. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/jan2000/burm-j24.shtml>, accessed on 17 Sept 2009.
- 15) "Japan's position regarding the Situation in Myanmar", MOFA Press Release, March 1997. See, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/myanmar/myanmar.html>
- 16) IMF, *Myanmar: Recent Economic Developments* (Washington, DC: IMF, 1 October 1995), pp. 18-19. Quoted from Maung Maung, 1998, p. 138.
- 17) According to the ADB, by 2001 Myanmar was \$2.5 billion in arrears. See, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2003/mya.asp>, visited on 23 September 2004.
- 18) See, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/measure0212-2.html>, visited on 9 May 2005.
- 19) See, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/cost2/>, visited on 10 May 2005.
- 20) Interview with JICA officials, 2003-4.
- 21) "Revision of Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter", August 2003, see: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf>, visited on 28 March 2005.
- 22) "Japan's ODA Annual Report 1999"

ミャンマーに対しての日本外交の全方向性の抑制

ストレフォード・パトリック

要 旨

日本の対ミャンマーのODAは、原則として1990年代から21世紀初期に渡って凍結されてきたにも関わらず、日本の対ミャンマー外交は、受け入れ国の“動向”に従って支払われてきた。それは、受け入れ国に肯定的な動向があれば、ODA資金を与え、否定的な動向があれば、ODA資金を凍結するということを意味する。

しかしながら、この外交は、いくつもの国際的、および国内的要因によって大きく制約される。これらの要因は、全方位と呼ばれるほど、非常に多く、網羅的である。

キーワード：日本、政府開発援助、外交、ミャンマー、抑制